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The Department of Consumers
W. E. Forte*
In discussing the proposal to establish a Department of Consumers
at the cabinet level of the Government, Mr. Forte discusses the many
regulatory functions of the several consumer-oriented agencies which
could be transferred to the new department, and he details the many
problems attendant upon this consolidation of functions. He concludes
that the Department of Consumers may eliminate much of the in-
efficiency implicit in the present division of responsibility of consumer
protection among various agencies. However, the author warns that
the difficulties involved in merging functions of the FTC and the FDA
in one department warrant serious legal study in order to avoid the
pitfall of hasty and ill-conceived legislation which could result in juris-
dictional problems, and he calls for the formation of a committee to
conduct such a study.
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1872, Congress began protecting the American consumer by
enacting legislation to prevent mail fraud.1 From this modest begin-
ning, the consumer protection activities of the federal government
have proliferated until today there are at least 33 government agen-
cies engaged in 296 consumer protection activities.2 In 1961, the esti-
mated annual expenditures by the federal government for direct con-
sumer protection activities totalled 272 million dollars and the number
of full-time federal employees engaged in such activities was almost
22,000.3 Expenditures for consumer advancement, a broader concept,
were estimated at 681 million dollars in 1961 and the number of full
time- federal employees assigned to such work was nearly 43,000.
4
C Member of the Pennsylvania Bar. B.B.A., Clark University, 1956, LL.B., New
York University, 1959, LL.M. (Trade Reg.), 1965. The views contained in this
article- are the author's personal views on trade regulation law.
1. 17 Stat. §§ 296-306 (1872), as amended, 39 U.S.C. § 4005 (1964).
2. See HOUSE Comm. ON GOv'T OPEnATIONs, CONSUTm PROTECTION AcnvrriEs OF
FEDErAL DEnAamxrNis AND AcFNcrms, H.R. REP. No. 1241, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 4,
23 (1961).
3. Id. at 4-5, 25.
4. Id.
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Current figures for such expenditures and employees would surely
be substantially greater.5
This vast expenditure of money and time was not coordinated or
administered by any single department or agency of the federal
government. The activities were conducted independently except
when independent federal agencies, in their own discretion, found it
advisable to consult among themselves.
Individual consumers find it difficult to determine what programs
are available for their benefit and what agency has jurisdiction over
each program. 6 Some consumers also believe that the federal govern-
ment is not responsive to their needs because they have no "spokes-
man" at this level of government.7 While these difficulties have been
mitigated by the appointment of a Special Assistant to the President
for Consumer Affairs," some feel that more can and should be done.
One proposed solution is the creation of a Department of Consumers
or a Department of Consumer Affairs 9 at the cabinet level of the
federal government.
The bill to create a Department of Consumers originated with the
5. Inflation and increases in compensation for federal employees alone probably
would have increased the expense of consumer protection activities substantially. More
important, however, has been the constant expansion in consumer protection activities
during the 1960's. In addition to the costs of expanding existing consumer protection
programs, there must be included the costs of administering the following statutes
which have been enacted since 1961: Fair Packaging and Labeling Act, 15 U.S.C. §
1451 (Supp. 1966); Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1381 (Supp.
1966); Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1331 (Supp.
1966); Drug Abuse Control Amendments of 1965, 21 U.S.C. § 360(a) (Supp. 1965);
Child Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1261 (Supp. 1966); and Drug Amendments of 1962,
21 U.S.C. § 321 (1964).
6. See Hearings on H.R. 7179 Before the Executive and Legislative Reorganization
Subcomm. of the Comm. on Govt Operations, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 160, 164-65
(1966) [hereinafter cited as House Hearings] and Hearings on S. 1571 Before the
Subcomm. on Reorganization and Int'l Organizations of the Comm. on Gov't Operations,
86th Cong., 2d Sess. 43, 75-78 (1960) [hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings]. Con-
sumers' problems in determining the jurisdiction of government agencies are not
unique. Experienced lawyers sometimes have difficulty in determining either the re-
spective jurisdictions of government agencies or, more commonly, which agency to
consult when two or more agencies have jurisdiction over the same practice.
7. See House Hearings 31-32, 36-39, 83, 114, 124.
8. The present Special Assistant to the President for Consumer Affairs is Betty
Furness. Her predecessor was Esther Peterson. The appointment of a Special Assistant
to the President for Consumer Affairs is the most important but is not the only action
taken to increase consumer influence in government. See Peterson, Representing the
Consumer Interest in Government, 64 Micar. L. RFv. 1323 (1966), for the history of
consumer representation in the federal government. Other actions include the establish-
ment of the President's Committee on Consumer Interests and the Consumer Advisory
Council, see Barber, Government and the Consumer, 64 MicH. L. REV. 1203, 1213-14
(1966) and House Hearings 240, and the appointment of former Sen. Maurene Ncu-
berger as consumer consultant to the Food and Drug Administration.
9. The original proposal of Sen. Kefauver was to create a Department of Consumers.
See S. 1571, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959). For consistency only a single designation,
"The Department of Consumers," is used in this article.
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late Senator Estes Kefauver' 0 and is now sponsored by Representative
Paul Fino of New York." A related bill is sponsored by Represen-
tative Benjamin S. Rosenthal of New York.12  The Fino bill would
authorize the Department of Consumers to present the viewpoint of
consumers in the formulation of policies of the government and to
represent the economic interests of consumers in proceedings before
courts and regulatory agencies.' 3 These provisions are intended to
provide a consumer spokesman in the federal government.
Another function of the Department of Consumers would be to re-
ceive complaints from consumers, refer them to the proper agency
and ascertain the nature and extent of action taken on these com-
10. Sen. Kefauver's speech in introducing this bill contains most of the arguments
that are made today in favor of a Department of Consumers. 105 CoNG. REc. 5335-41,
March 26, 1959. Hearings were held on the bill in 1960, but the bill remained in
committee. Succeeding bills suffered the same fate.
11. H.R. 6921, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
12. Rep. Rosenthal's bill, H.R. 7179, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965), though similar to
the Kefauver-Fino Bills, would transfer to the Department of Consumers only a
part of the Food and Drug Administration. The proposed division leaves all functions
of the Food and Drug Administration relating to drugs, devices and cosmetics
in the FDA; and it would transfer all functions of the FDA relating to misbranding
(but not adulteration) of food and relating to' standards of identity, quality and fill
of container of foods to the Department of Consumers. Id. It is difficult to understand
the reasoning behind this division of responsibility. Consumers are at least as con-
cerned with the adulteration of foods as with the misbranding of foods and it would
seem that the administration of both powers should be in the Department of Con-
sumers. Additionally, the line between adulteration and misbranding is not at all
clear in some situations, and two different agencies would often have jurisdiction over
the same offense if Rep. Rosenthal's bill were adopted. Finally, the division of re-
sponsibility seems inadvisable because it would split the FDA without discernible
reason and because it would reduce the responsibilities transferred to the Department
of Consumers, although critics have already charged that not enough responsibility is
being given to make the Department of Consumers equal to other federal departments.
See note 19 infra. In view of these difficulties, the legislation reviewed in this article
will be the Kefauver-Fino bill, and general references to the "proposed legislation" or
the "bill to establish a Department of Consumers" refer to the Kefauver-Fino bills.
13. See H.R. 6921, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 5-6 (1967). The bill provides that
the Department of Consumers may intervene in regulatory proceedings as a matter of
right if (a) the proceeding does not involve the adjudication of an alleged violation
and (b) the matter may substantially affect the economic interests of consumers within
the United States. Id. § 6(a). When the proceeding does involve adjudication of a
violation in regulatory or court proceedings, the Department may certify all relevant
information in its possession to the government officer or employee presenting this
case for the government. Id. § 6(b). Finally, in any appellate court proceeding which
may substantially affect the economic interests of consumers within the United States,
the Department could seek to file consumers' views as an amicus curiae to the appellate
review. Id. § 6(c). Supporters of the bill believe that the information presented in
adjudicative proceedings is generally information compiled by producers. See House
Hearings 152-53. The intervention procedure would also permit information compiled
by the Department of Consumers to be submitted, thus protecting the consumers eco-
nomic interest. See House Hearings 92-93. This intervention procedure would, of
course, sometimes result in two departments of the federal government-a regulatory
agency and the Department of Consumers-seeking contrary results in the same case.
Id. at 60. The federal government would, therefore, not be speaking in a single voice
with a unity of purpose in the litigation. Id.
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plaints.' 4 This would permit consumers to send all complaints to a
single department, reducing consumer perplexity concerning the in-
tricacies of the jurisdiction of federal agencies. The legislation would
also authorize the Department of Consumers to administer the Food
and Drug Administration and certain agencies of the federal govern-
ment which compile and disseminate information helpful to con-
sumers.19 This would consolidate a few consumer-oriented activities
of the federal government in the proposed Department but would,
of course, leave most consumer protection activities to be conducted
by the federal government outside the Department.16 Therefore, the
plan is primarily for the proposed Department to make the existing
consumer protection programs more effective by influencing the vari-
ous departments and agencies now administering the programs rather
than by taking operating responsibility for consumer protection pro-
grams.
17
14. Id. § 7.
15. Id. § 8. The bill would transfer to the Department of Consumers the Food
and Drug Administration, the Division of Prices and Cost of Living of the Department
of Labor, the Home Economics Research Branch and the Human Nutrition Research
Branch of the Department of Agriculture, and those elements of the National Bureau
of Standards which the Director of the Bureau of the Budget shall determine to be
engaged primarily in research with respect to, or the testing of, articles intended for
use by consumers.
16. Consumer-oriented activities are so diverse and administered by so many different
departments and agencies that even when a Department of Consumers is established,
it is inevitable that most of these activities will not be consolidated. For a list of these
activities, which vary from the regulation of air carrier rates to the insuring of with-
drawable accounts in savings and loan associations, see Cozmr. ON Cov'T OprnATIONs,
CONSUMM PnOT MCON Acnvrrms oF FEID. DEP'Ts AND AGENCIES, H.R. REP. No. 1241,
87th Cong., 1st Sess. 6-22 (1961). See also House Hearings 241. However, it should
be possible to consolidate in a single enforcement agency many of the basic regulatory
laws giving consumers protection in their purchases of ordinary and necessary goods.
This more modest goal is the premise of this article. If a Department of Consumers
were established on this foundation, it would probably prove possible to transfer more
of the existing consumer protection programs to this Department at a later date.
Additionally, as new consumer protection laws are enacted, Congress would probably
assign their administration, if possible, to this Department.
17. See House Hearings 101. The plan of creating a government department partly
for the purpose of having it influence other government departments and agencies to
give greater consideration to consumer interests is an intriguing and apparently unique
concept. See House Hearings 107. The plan is one which is born partly of necessity.
As pointed out in note 16 supra, it is impossible to consolidate all consumer-oriented
activities in a single agency or department. One remedy would seem to be for the
President to appoint consumer-oriented men to administer the other departments of
government and thus get greater consideration for the consumer. However, many con-
sumers have little faith in this solution. They seem to believe that, whatever the
philosophy of presidential appointees when they are appointed, these agency heads and
their subordinates become captives of the regulated industry. See House Hearings 31-
32, 59, 83-84, 88, 106, 124, 144, 211 and Senate Hearings 30-31, 33, 40, 99, 133-35.
Also, even when agencies do not become captives of the regulated industry, the agen-
cies are frequently required to adjudicate matters affecting consumers who are un-
represented in the proceedings. Consumers themselves cannot supply a spokesman be-
cause they are so numerous that organization is difficult and their breadth of interests
[ VOL. 20
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Those who have opposed the Department of Consumers in legis-
lative hearings have raised several interesting counter-arguments.
They suggest that the bill would create primarily a "lobbying" agency
and that the Department cannot be an effective lobbyist for consumer
interests because the President will not tolerate a department which
publicly seeks more action for consumers than he himself desires.1
8
They also argue that federal departments customarily administer a
wide range of interrelated programs directed toward a common goal,
and that an agency which is primarily a lobbying and information
disseminating organization would not have sufficient operating re-
sponsibilities and stature to be a department of the federal govern-
ment.'
9
It is apparent that the arguments against the proposed Department
are, in part at least, interrelated. The Department would be
reduced to lobbying with other government agencies for action favor-
able to consumer interests because it would have no direct control
over the consumer protection activities of these other agencies. Simi-
larly, the proposed structure of the Department of Consumers is
considered inadequate by comparison with other government depart-
ments because not enough of the present consumer protection activi-
ties of the federal government would be transferred to it. Therefore,
the logical compromise between proponents and opponents of the bill
would seem to be to transfer more of the major consumer protection
activities of the federal government to the new Department.20 Such
would require the expensive maintenance of a large organization qualified to speak
expertly on many diverse subjects. Cf. House Hearings 43. This type of reasoning
leads to the conclusion that the only solution is to establish a consumer spokesman
within the federal government.
18. See House Hearings 60-61, 67-68, 75, 90. Cf. Jones, The Role of Administrative
Agencies as Instruments of Social Reform, 19 AD. L. Rav. 279, 287 (1967). The Sec-
retary of Consumers would therefore have to exercise a persuasive influence upon the
President and other department heads if he were to secure more progress for con-
sumers. A related objection is that the creation of a Department of Consumers would
add excessive responsibilities to the President. As critics of the bill see it, existing
governmental agencies represent both producers and consumers and the competing
interest of these groups are arbitrated within the agencies. If instead, producers were
represented by one department and consumers by another, the President would con-
tinually be refereeing squabbles between them. House Hearings 97-98.
19. Id. at 53-54, 147, 149, 242, 246. Opponents also argue that if the Department
of Consumers were established, it would have no influence because of its lack of
regulatory responsibility. Id. at 107-08.
20. The creation of a cabinet-level department of the federal government is, of
course, a rare occurrence. However, the growing complexity of the federal government
promises to make the creation of such departments more frequent in the future. See
H.R. 1701, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966). The witnesses seemed to agree that the
decision to create a new department was a pragmatic decision but that generally a
new department should be established when there was such a quantity of interrelated
activities, programs and body of law that it cannot efficiently function as an appendage
to an existing government department or in a multitude of government agencies and
departments. House Hearings 136, 246, 250. On this point a proponent of the bill
1967 ]
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an approach could raise the new Department to the level of the other
departments of the federal government and reduce its dependency
on lobbying by reason of its greater potential for direct action. How-
ever, implicit in such a compromise would probably be a recognition
that the proposed Department cannot concern itself with all con-
sumer-oriented activities and pursue consumer complaints about all
subjects.21 Some consumer protection programs would then remain
under the jurisdiction of their present departments (which are con-
cerned with producers', as well as consumers', interests), free from
lobbying by the Department of Consumers. Thus, the Department of
Consumers would be primarily a regulatory department, administering
a consolidated set of basic consumer protection lawvs. s2
If the major consumer protection activities of the federal govern-
ment are truly capable of being interrelated, the consolidation would
result in several benefits. For example, first, it would facilitate an
exchange of information by those engaged in similar activities, elimi-
nate some situations in which independent agencies each defer to the
other's jurisdiction (leaving consumers without a remedy),23 and
permit a shifting of government personnel engaged in consumer pro-
tection according to the relative priorities of their projects. Second, it
would also permit consumers to send their complaints to a single
government department which would have jurisdiction over many im-
testified: "A cardinal principle of public administration is to avoid having different
functions which are closely related and directed to some sort of general purpose
scattered among a different number of agencies, as is presently the case with respect
to such consumer-oriented functions of Government as do exist." Senate Hearings 103.
21. It seems that this would be a necessary conclusion in any event since to pursue
competently all consumer complaints on all subjects would require either a large staff
of technically trained personnel having substantial experience in many diverse fields or
remarkably capable and versatile agency personnel. Cf. House Hearings 43.
22. Bills to establish a Department of Consumers have not yet followed this ap-
proach. The probable reason is that to combine our basic consumer protection laws
means at least to merge the consumer protection programs of the FDA and the FTC,
and certain parts of the Department of Agriculture and Bureau of Commercial Fish-
eries of the Department of Interior. Such a move would raise complex legal questions
and would probably also raise the combined opposition of all of these agencies. Those
who advocate a Department of Consumers apparently have been either unwilling to
face this opposition or incapable of resolving the legal problems. However, some
witnesses have advocated this type of consolidation. See House Hearings 39-41, 54, 57,
111 and Senate Hearings 41, 43, 120. It is interesting to note that Sen. Kefauver's own
views were not fixed insofar as the particular functions which were to be transferred
to the Department. He believed simply that a transfer should be made where ". . . con-
solidation in a consumer-oriented department would lead to more efficient operation,
higher morale, and a general strengthening of the overall program through the new
focus and unity of purpose." Senate Hearings 32.
23. When two agencies have concurrent jurisdiction over the same practice, both
procedural and substantive legal problems can arise. Neither agency may act, or both
agencies may take action, causing an unwarranted expenditure of time and money
and raising fundamental issues of fair play insofar as the defendant's rights are con-
cerned. Moreover, if two agencies act consecutively, difficult questions of res judicata
and collateral estoppel may arise.
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portant consumer problems and could refer the remaining complaints
to other agencies for their appropriate independent action. Consumers
seeking helpful information would find it convenient to secure such
information from a consolidated department handling most consumer
protection programs, and state and local governments would find it
more effective to coordinate enforcement with a unified department.4
While its lobbying function would be reduced in scope, the Depart-
ment, like others, could, with the President's approval, support new
legislation when needed to aid it in carrying out its assigned responsi-
bilities. Therefore, the Department of Consumers could be economical,
efficient and effective.25
At least as important as the above are the intangible benefits which
might result from the establishment of a Department of Consumers.
Two of the government agencies which now administer consumer
protection activities-the Department of Agriculture and the Bureau
of Commercial Fisheries of the Department of Interior-have as their
principal function the promotion of producers' interests.26 The Federal
24. The creation of a Department of Consumers would probably have an important
effect upon state consumer protection programs. The states would then have a unified
federal department which could secure information about consumer frauds, and which
could set an example for state legislation. See House Hearings 40, 86-87.
25. A simple example of the possible benefits involves distribution of educational
material to consumers by various agencies of the federal government. Information
helpful to consumers is now distributed by at least the Department of Agriculture,
the Food and Drug Administration and the Federal Trade Commission. Such informa-
tion includes educational material relating to grade labeling (USDA), standards of
identity and mandatory labeling requirements for foods (FDA), and frauds practiced
against unwary consumers (FTC). The most successful agency in distributing such
literature is probably the Department of Agriculture, and it can be considered successful
only by comparison with the totally unimpressive record of the other two agencies.
If a unified Office of Consumer Education were established and adequately funded
within the Department of Consumers, it should be able to coordinate and improve
the dissemination of information to consumers.
26. There is no doubt that the Department of Agriculture and the Bureau of Com-
merical Fisheries perform very real services for consumers. However, when a con-
flict arises between producers' interests and consumers' interests, these departments
frequently support the producers. For example, in early 1967 the Secretary of Agri-
culture stated publicly that consumers should be prepared to pay a little more for
their food. Dairy Record, March 29, 1967, at 5, col. 1. This statement was not con-
ducive to influencing producers to hold a stable price on foods sold to consumers.
When an enforcement agency is charged principally with the promotion of producers'
interests, it is also not likely to be over-zealous in regulating these producers. For
example, it is clear that historically the Department of Agriculture exercised an un-
healthy influence upon the FDA and it may have been this influence which prompted
President Roosevelt to transfer the FDA to the Federal Security Agency stating,
"[t]he work of the Food and Drug Administration is unrelated to the basic functions
of the Department of Agriculture." See S. WILSON, FOOD AND Davu REGu AnON 76-79,
149-50 (1942). The Department of Agriculture and Department of Interior now
occupy the same anomalous position in regard to their inspection and grade labeling
activities as was once occupied by the USDA in its administration of the FDA. The
first Hoover Commission, however, believed the Department of Agriculture would be
vigorous in its protection of the consumer interest. See REPORT OF =HE ComrissioN
o H = ORGANizATIoN OF =HE ExEcuTrIvE BnAxcH OF THE GovEaNm '¢r 251 -(1951).
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Trade Commission (as its name indicates) was originally intended to
protect honest businesses from dishonest competition. As recently as
1960, the then chairman of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC)
testified, "So I think that while our primary purpose may be the pro-
tection of honest businessmen, certainly, we have an ancillary assign-
ment of protecting the public generally and consumers."21
Creation of a Department of Consumers would be a clear notice to
individual consumers that there was a department of the federal
government which was concerned principally with their problems.
Consumers would probably respond to the establishment of the new
department by sharply increasing the number of complaints and
other communications sent by them to the government. The transfer
to the Department of Consumers of functions now performed by
other government agencies would also be a clear notice to the per-
sonnel involved in these functions that the consumer's interest is to
be their first concern. These agencies might therefore become more
responsive to consumer demands and consumer needs for greater
protection. Thus, establishing a Department of Consumers would
probably increase rapport between consumers and government and
might result in a revitalization of government personnel involved in
consumer protection.
The principal arguments against consolidation of more consumer
protection activities in a Department of Consumers rest upon technical
and political considerations. The problem of devising legislation which
consolidates government agencies without adversely affecting their
powers and performance is complicated by the differences in structure
of governmental agencies (e.g., compare the administrative structure
of the FDA with the quasi-judicial structure of the FTC) 28 and by
the present inter-relationships of government agencies (e.g., the FDA
is now located in the same department as U. S. Public Health and
therefore has convenient access to Health Department research),.p
The existing government departments and agencies which would be
reduced in size and importance by reason of the transfer of part of
their functions to the new Department also present a formidable po-
litical force opposed to such consolidation30 Understandably, these
27. Senate Hearings 49.
28. See text accompanying notes 39 and 179-81 infra.
29. See Senate Hearings 19, 101-02, for a review of this objection. It is also
argued that it would be inappropriate to transfer the Department of Agriculture's
Institute of Home Economics to the Department of Consumers since this Institute's re-
search is helpful to producers as well as consumers.
30. This is recognized by supporters of the bill to establish a Department of Con-
sumers. As Rep. Rosenthal said, "[Mlany agency heads do not like to offer to be
transferred. They do not like to give up jurisdiction. I find they are somewhat jealous
of their prerogative, and everybody in bureaucracy tends to be a status quo kind of
operator." House Hearings 159. No government department has supported the bill;
[ VOL. 20
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departments and agencies now feel that they are providing great pro-
tection for consumers and that they could do even better if they were
given greater appropriations and more power."' Yet, as indicated
above, there are advantages to the consolidation approach if the po-
litical and technical difficulties can be overcome.
A determination of the consumer protection activities which can be
transferred successfully to the Department of Consumers can begin
conveniently with an understanding of the functions which the pend-
ing legislation would transfer to the Department.32 The sole regula-
tory agency which would be transferred to the Department of Con-
sumers under the proposed legislation is the Food and Drug Adminis-
tration,3 now administered by the Secretary of Health, Education
and Welfare. FDA's primary responsibility is to prevent the adulte-
ration or misbranding of foods, drugs, devices and cosmetics.- How-
ever, it also administers the Hazardous Substances Labeling Act, a
statute intended to require proper warning statements on the labels
of hazardous household articles.3 Violations of statutes administered
by the FDA are generally prosecuted by seizures of the offending
articles (which are required to be brought into compliance with the
act or destroyed),36 injunctions to prevent a continuation of viola-
tions, 37 or criminal actions against those responsible for the viola-
tions.8 The FDA has no quasi-judicial authority, and enforcement
(other than by moral suasion) 39 is exclusively through court actions.
In the administration of its powers over foods, drugs, devices and
cosmetics, the FDA: prevents false and misleading labeling; enforces
mandatory labeling requirements governing consumer products; in-
virtually all departments affected by the bill have voiced general disapproval or specific
objections (while not purporting to pass on the bill in general). House Hearings 159,
194-95.
31. See, e.g., Senate Hearings 48 and House Hearings 278-96.
32. Those who have advocated a Department of Consumers have consistently viewed
the FDA as an appropriate regulatory agency to be made a part of the new depart-
ment. See S. 1571, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959), and H.R. 6921, 90th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1967). It seems appropriate therefore to look for agencies which perform fumctions
similar to those of the FDA to find additional functions which can be consolidated
as part of the Department of Consumers.
33. See note 15 supra.
34. See 21 U.S.C. § 331 (1964).
35. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1261-73 (1964). The FDA also administers the Federal
Caustic Poison Act, the Import Milk Act, the Filled Milk Act and the Tea Importation
Act. F.D. CosM. L. REP. ff 2441.
36. Federal Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 334 (Supp. 1965); Federal
Hazardous Substances Labeling Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1265 (1964).
37. Federal Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 332 (Supp. 1965); Federal
Hazardous Substances Labeling Act, 21 U.S.C. § 1267 (1964).
38. Federal Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 333 (Supp. 1965); .Federal
Hazardous Substances Labeling Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1264 (1964).
39. This may include threats of criminal prosecution. See Austern, Sanctions in
Silhouette: An Inquiry into the Enforcement. of the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic
Act, 18 Food DRuv CosM. L.J. 617, 626-28 (1963).
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spects factories and plants of producers to detect possible statutory
violations and prohibits or restricts sale of unsafe or dangerous pro-
ducts; and sets governmental standards prescribing the composition
of foods and drugs to prevent cheats.
Since other government agencies perform similar functions, the
proper foundation for a Department of Consumers could be laid by
transferring to the new department those parts of these agencies
concerned with such similar functions. Those similar functions are
described below.
II. REGULATORY FUNCIONS Wmcii COULD BE TnANSF~mRRD
TO A DEPARTmENT OF CONsUMERs
A. False and Misleading Labeling, Advertising and Other
Unfair Acts and Deceptive Practices
The FDA has the power to prevent false and misleading labeling of
foods, drugs, devices and cosmetics 40 The Federal Trade Commission
has the power under Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act
to prevent unfair trade practices and unfair or deceptive acts or
practices.41 Under Section 5, The FTC can take action against the
false and misleading labeling of all commodities (including foods,
drugs, devices and cosmetics which fall within FDA's jurisdiction)
and also against false and misleading advertising of all commodities.
42
Therefore, the FTC's power not only encompasses but also exceeds
the FDA's power over false and misleading promotional claims.
43
The proper exercise of the FTC's power over false and misleading
advertising and labeling is vital to the consumer's economic interests.
Consumers today frequently purchase their foods, drugs, shoes, cloth-
ing and other necessaries in large self-service stores. Their decision
to purchase is increasingly influenced by representations in advertising
and labeling rather than by the personal salesmanship of the corner
grocer or tailor of another generation. Control over the representa-
tions which influence purchase is probably the single most important
40. Foods which bear false and misleading labeling are misbranded. Federal Food,
Drug & Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 343(a) (1964). Misbranded foods may be seized,
see statute cited in note 36 supra, or injunctive or criminal actions may be brought
against those responsible for the misbranding. See statutes cited notes 37 and 38 supra.
41. 21 U.S.C. § 45 (1958).
42. See Kelley & Cassedy, The Federal Trade Commission Act as Amended by the
Wheeler-Lea Act, 2 Foon DRUG Cosm. L.Q. 315, 322 (1947).
43. See Fresh Grown Preserve Corp. v. FTC, 125 F.2d 917 (2d Cir. 1942), and
Kelley & Cassedy, supra note 42. See also Forte, The Food and Drug Administration,
The Federal Trade Commission and the Deceptive Packaging of Foods, 40 N.Y.U.
L. REv. 860, 861 n.6 (1965).
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element in the economic protection of the consumer.44 If a Depart-
ment of Consumers were established, the power to control false and
misleading promotional claims should certainly be transferred to that
department.
There would be clear advantages in the consolidation of FDA's
power over false and misleading labeling and the FTC's power over
false and misleading labeling and advertising if that consolidation is
technically and politically feasible.4 The same claims are frequently
made on product labels and in descriptive promotional literature
within the FDA's jurisdiction, and in newspaper, magazine, radio
and television advertising within the FTC's jurisdiction. In such
situations, the FDA and the FTC are confronted with the same issues
-whether the claims are false or misleading-and the same evidence
is determinative of these issues. It is desirable for the FDA and the
FTC to cooperate closely in investigating and prosecuting such cases
and this cooperation would be furthered by having all personnel work-
ing upon the cases within the same department.
Additionally, whether the FDA or the FTC is the agency primarily
responsible for taling action against promotional claims relating to
foods, drugs, devices and cosmetics now depends upon whether these
claims are made in labeling or advertising.46 The distinction between
44. As many trademark and some food and drug cases recognize, purchasers gen-
erally exercise very little care in the purchase of ordinary low-priced goods. See
Forte, The Ordinary Purchaser and The Federal Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act, 52 VA.
L. REV. 1467, 1478-83 (1966).
45. Analogous support for this type of consolidation can be found in the report
of the first Hoover Commission and in the report of the Task Force of the Second
Hoover Commission. Both reports note the illogic of the present division of re-
sponsibility and suggest as a possible remedy the consolidation of the FDA's regulatory
power over foods and the FTC's regulatory power over the advertising of foods in
the Department of Agriculture. See REPORT OF Tm COMMISSION ON ORGAnTION
or THE ExEctrnv BRANCH OF T=E Govmu*A= 250-51 (1951); THE COMMISSION
ON ORGANIZATION OF =x ExEcurrrvE BRANCH OF mH GovFxtN TASK FORCE
REPORT ON LEGAL SERViCES AND PRocEotUEs 121-31 (1955). The establishment of a
reorganized Drug Bureau governing advertising and labeling of drugs was also
recommended. See id. The Second Hoover Commission Report did not expressly
advocate the reorganization recommended in the Task Force Report, but the Commission
did say that duplicating and overlapping jurisdiction of federal agencies should be
reduced to a minimum by delegating authority to the states, or by reorganizing the
authority of federal agencies over the same subject of a single agency, or by combining
agencies in a commission so that they perform a specialized regulatory function. See
REPORT OF TH COMMISSION ON THE ORGANIZATION OF THE ExEcUTIvE BRANCH OF THE
GovRNMEN TAsK FORCE REPORT ON LEGAL S av Es AND PRoCmES 48 (1955).
This type of consolidation would be possible in the Department of Consumers.
46. Although the FTC now has jurisdiction over both- labeling and advertising, by
agreement with the FDA the FTC generally permits the' FDA to exercise sole juris-
diction over all matters regulating the labeling of foods, drugs, devices, and cosmetics.
See 3 ThADE tG. RaP. ff 9850.03 (1965). Siniflarly,'the FDA has recognized the
FTC's right generally to exercise sole jurisdiction over all matters regulating the adver-
tising of foods, drugs, devices, and cosmetics. See id.
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labeling and advertising has never been entirely clear,47 and in border-
line situations defendant's lawyers can argue to each agency that the
matter primarily falls within the other's jurisdiction. Alternatively,
when complaints arise relating to promotional claims in borderline
situations, each agency can disclaim responsibility for failing to take
action against these claims by arguing that the matter lies primarily
within the other's jurisdiction. While consolidation would not end the
distinction between labeling and advertising, it would reduce the
importance of this distinction by making it clear that the responsi-
bility for handling all false and misleading claims rests solely in the
Department of Consumers.
48
The present jurisdictional distinction between claims made in
labeling and claims made in advertising is grounded almost exclusive-
ly in history rather than logic. The FDA's power to prohibit false
and misleading labeling was expressly conferred upon its predecessor
agency by the 1906 Food and Drugs Act49 and was expressly con-
firmed in the superseding statute, The Federal Food, Drug and
Cosmetic Act of 1938.50 The FTC's power to regulate false and mis-
leading labeling and advertising finds no such clear congressional
consideration. When Congress enacted the Federal Trade Commis-
sion Act in 1914 authorizing the FTC to take action against "unfair
methods of competition,"51 it was concerned primarily with adding
another weapon to the arsenal against trusts and monopolies rather
than with preventing false and misleading labeling and advertising. 2
47. The United States Supreme Court has held that the labeling does not have
to physically accompany the product. Kordel v. United States, 335 U.S. 345, 350
(1948). While the Supreme Court clearly did not mean to grant the FDA authority to
regulate advertising in general, the status of such things as promotional material
distributed by mail remains doubtful. See id., which seems to imply such material
could be within FDA jurisdiction. The concurrent jurisdiction of the FDA and the
FTC is reviewed in Developments in the Law-Deceptive Advertising, 80 HArv. L.
Ray. 1005, 1116-17 (1967) and in the First and Second Citizens Advisory Committee
Reports, 10 FooD DRuG Cosm. L.J. 453, 514 (1955) and 17 FooD Druiv Cosar. L.J.
581, 670 (1962).
48. The jurisdictional difference might still be important since actions brought
under the Federal Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act for false and misleading labeling could
result in criminal penalties while actions brought under the Federal Trade Commission
Act could only result in cease and desist orders. However, the Department of Con-
sumers would be under more pressure to prosecute by one route or the other since
the matter would be clearly within its jurisdiction.
49. Act of June 30, 1906, ch. 3915, § 8, 34 Stat. 768 (repealed by 52 Stat. 1059
(1938)).
50. See Federal Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 343(a) (1964).
51. Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1) (1964).
52. See G. HmsmnsoN, ThE FEDERAL TRADE CoamaIss ON 33-38, 339 (1924); Kinter,
Federal Trade Commission Regulation of Advertising, 64 MicH. L. REv. 1269, 1272-74
(1966); Millstein, The Federal Trade Commission and False Advertising, 64 COLUM. L.
BEv. 439, 450-51 (1964). See also Developments In The Law-Deceptive Advertising,
supra note 47, at 1019, in which it is noted that the power to regulate false adver-




Indeed, the legality of the FTC's regulation of false and misleading
advertising under the "unfair methods of competition" prohibition of
the FTC Act was originally considered highly questionable by some
authorities.
53
In the 1930's, a determined effort was made to move jurisdiction
over false and misleading advertising of foods, drugs, cosmetics and
devices from the FTC to the FDA.54 This effort was unsuccessful,
primarily because it was considered beneficial to have the authority
to prohibit false and misleading advertising of all commodities in a
single agency.5  Thus, the FTC's defense to the attempted removal
of part of its false and misleading advertising function to the FDA
rested almost entirely upon the fact that the FTC had, under section
5 of the FTC Act, already assumed the responsibility for false and
misleading advertising of all products. Politically, the FTC also made
a valiant and successful effort to prevent the transfer of part of its
advertising responsibility, causing a distinguished member of the
House, Sam Rayburn, to say, "There might be a little lobbying around
here by some people, but there is nobody who has lobbied around
this Capitol on any bill in the 23 years I have been in Congress more
than the members of the Federal Trade Commission have lobbied
on this bill ....
If it is advantageous to have all responsibility for prohibiting false
and misleading advertising consolidated in one agency, it would seem
even more advantageous to have the responsibility for prohibiting all
false and misleading advertising and labeling consolidated in a single
enforcement authority.
57
The Department of Agriculture's authority over false and mislead-
ing labeling should also be consolidated in the Department of Con-
53. See id.
54. See generally C. DUNN, FEDEP AL Foon, Dnuv & COSMETIC ACT, A STATEMENT
op rrs LEGiSLATVE REcoRD (1938); Young, The Government and the Consumer:
Evolution of Food and Drug Laws-The 1938 Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 13 J.
PuB. L. 197 (1964).
55. See H.R. REP. No. 1613, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937).
56. C. DirNN, supra note 54, at 633.
57. Sen. Copeland noted during debate on the Wheeler-Lea amendments to the
Federal Trade Commission Act that identical problems are often involved in proceed-
ings against false statements on labels and false statements in advertising. Complex
scientific questions arise in the administration of food and drug laws and the Food
and Drug Administration has assembled a competent scientific staff capable of dealing
with them. For the FTC to prosecute false and misleading representations in adver-
tising involving these questions, the FTC either has to duplicate the FDA's scientific
staff or secure the information from the FDA or some other source. See C. DuNN,
WHEELER-LEA ACT, A STATEMENT OF ITs LEGISLATrVE RECORD 336-37 (1938). While
the FTC can secure information from the FDA, these two agencies often seem to be
motivated in part by competitive considerations, and it is doubtful whether the FTC




sumers. Meat and meat food products58 and poultry and poultry food
products59 are exempted from the FDA's authority under the Federal
Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act. The Department of Agriculture has
authority over false and misleading labeling of these products. 61 Since
false and misleading labeling of meat and meat food products and
poultry and poultry food products raises no legal questions other than
those generally involved in false and misleading labeling of foods, the
division of responsibility between FDA and the Department of Agri-
culture should be eliminated.
B. Mandatory Labeling and Disclosure
Before consumers can make an intelligent selection and purchase,
they must be provided with basic information concerning the products
offered for sale.61 The information needed generally consists of the
answers to one or more of the following questions: What is the prod-
uct and what is its general composition? Who made the product? What
quantity of the product is offered for sale and what price is asked for
that quantity? The necessity for having this type of information is the
foundation of our mandatory labeling and disclosure laws.62
Under the Federal Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act, the FDA has the
responsibility for enforcing requirements that each food be labeled
with (1) its common or usual name,63 (2) a statement of its ingredi-
ents (if the food is fabricated from two or more ingredients, and if
58. The exemption from the Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act extends so far as meats
and meat food products are regulated by the Meat Inspection Act. See Federal Food,
Drug & Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 392 (1964).
59. The exemption is similar to that for meats. See Poultry and Poultry Products
Inspection Act, 21 U.S.C. § 467 (1964), and note 58 supra.
60. See Meat Inspection Act, 21 U.S.C. § 75 (1964); Poultry and Poultry Products
Inspection Act, 21 U.S.C. § 457-58 (1964); 9 C.F.R. § 317.8 (1967).
61. See Barber, Government and The Consumer, 64 Micu. L. REv. 1202-10
(1966), for the view that existing law does not give consumers sufficient information
to make an intelligent selection of goods. The same philosophy underlies Rep. Rosen-
thal's bill, H.R. 2374, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. § 9 (1967), which would establish an
info-tag system which would furnish more information to consumers.
62. In general, the Federal Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act requires all of this infor-
mation be placed upon labels of products under its jurisdiction with the exception
of the price. See statutes cited in notes 63-66, 69 infra. The FTC enforces similar laws
requiring labeling of textiles. See statutes cited notes 72-80 infra. There are, however,
no federal statutes requiring the price to be stated clearly on consumer goods. The
manufacturer, of course, does not usually fix the price charged at retail for his product
and a law requiring marking of the price on consumer goods would be directed at
retailers. Presumably, Congress could require that all foods, and other consumer com-
modities regulated by the Fair Packaging and Labeling Act be stamped clearly and
conspicuously with their price while held for sale after shipment in interstate com-
merce. However, enforcement might be difficult and would require a policing of
many small stores. This may be why Congress has never prescribed such a require-
ment.
63. Federal Food, Drug, & Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 343(i)(1) (1964). Standard-
ized foods must bear the name prescribed in the definition and standard of identity.
Federal Food, Drug, & Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 343(g) (1964).
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the government has not prescribed standards of identity for the
food);6 (3) an accurate statement of its quantity in terms of weight,
measure or numerical count (if the food is sold in package form), 65
and (4) the name and place of business of its manufacturer, packer,
or distributor (if the food is sold in package form). 66 The act does
not require a statement of the percentage of each ingredient of the
food in the finished product but the FDA generally considers the
proper practice to be a listing of ingredients in their decreasing order
of predominance in the finished food. Manufacturers have generally
complied with this practice.6 7 By regulation, the FDA has required
a statement of the percentage of each ingredient in hypoallergenic
foods.68
The Federal Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act also contains mandatory
labeling requirements for drugs, devices and cosmetics. Drugs, de-
vices and cosmetics are governed by requirements similar to those
relating to foods so far as the quantity statement and name of the
manufacturer, packer and distributor are concerned.6 9 However, the
labeling requirements for ingredients differ. No disclosure of the
ingredients of cosmetics is presently required.7 0 Drugs must bear a
statement of the name and quantity of each active ingredient, a
warning of habit-forming ingredients, and adequate directions for
use including a statement of the purposes for which the drug is
intended.7
1
The FTC enforces similar laws which are intended to protect the
public through mandatory labeling of consumer products. Among
these laws are the Wool Products Labeling Act72 the Fur Products
Labeling Act"3 and the Textile Fiber Products Identification Act.y4
64. Id. § 343(i)(2).
65. 1d. § 343(e) (2).
66. Id. § 343(e)(1).
67. In the FDA's proposed regulations under the Fair Packaging and Labeling Act
governing foods, the FDA required that ingredients be listed in order of decreasing
predominance. See 32 Fed. Reg. 4174, § 1.10(g) (1967). However, these regulations
have not become final. While no regulations have previously prescribed the order in
which ingredients are to be listed, the FDA's position has been that false and mis-
leading labeling may occur if ingredients are listed otherwise. See 21 C.F.R. § 1.104(d)
(1967).
68. See 21 C.F.R. § 125.8 (1967). A hypoallergenic food is a food purported to
be or represented for "special dietary use by man by reason of the decrease or absence
of any allergenic property." Id.
69. For drugs, see Federal Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 352 (1964)
and for cosmetics, see id. § 362.
70. Disclosure of the ingredients of cosmetics has not been required either by
statute or by FDA regulation probably because the composition of cosmetics is a
closely guarded trade secret.
71. See Federal, Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 352(d), (e) & (f)
(1964).
72. 15 U.S.C. §§ 68-68i (1964).
73. 15 U.S.C. §§ 69-69j (1964).
74. 15 U.S.C. §§ 70-70k (1964).
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The Wool Products Labeling Act requires each product containing
wool to bear a label disclosing by percentages the constituent fibers
contained therein. 5 The label must bear the name of the manu-
facturer, dealer or reseller76 The Textile Fiber Products Labeling
Act, in effect, extends the same requirements to other consumer textile
fiber products not included under the Wool Act.7 7 It applies to wear-
ing apparel, cosmetics and accessories, draperies, rugs, furnishings
and those textile products customarily used in households. 8 The Fur
Products Identification Act generally provides that labels, invoices
and advertisements for furs must bear the true English name of
the animal producing the fur, its country of origin (if imported) and
the manufacturer's name or other identification. 79 If the fur product
is composed of used, damaged or scrap fur, or fur that has been dyed
or bleached, these facts must also be disclosed.80
There is an essential similarity in purpose and in content between
these acts enforced by the FTC and the mandatory labeling sections
of the Federal Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act. Even the enforcement
of these acts is not wholly dissimilar. Although the FTC could bring
cease and desist proceedings for violations of the Wool, Textile, and
Fur Products Labeling Acts,81 under present law both agencies can
also handle violations by bringing injunctive or criminal actions
against the persons responsible for the misbranding and, with the
exception of the Textile Products Labeling Act, by bringing condem-
nation proceedings against the misbranded products.8 2 All of these
acts could be made a part of the responsibility of the Department
of Consumers.
The essential interrelationship of FDA's and FTC's mandatory label-
ing functions and the absurdity of vesting administration in two
separate agencies were made plain when Congress enacted the Fair
Packaging Act of 1966.83 This act governs the labeling and packaging
of all consumer commodities and provides, in part, that the administer-
ing agencies shall promulgate regulations establishing a uniform loca-
tion and print size for the net quantity statement of such commodi-
75. Wool Prod. Labeling Act, 15 U.S.C. § 68b(a)(2)-(4) (1964).
76. Id. § 68b(a)(2) (C).
77. Textile Fiber Prods. Identification Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 70-70b (1964).
78. Id. § 70g.
79. Fur Prods. Labeling Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 69b-69c (1964).
80. Id.
81. Wool Prods. Labeling Act, 15 U.S.C. § 68d (1964); Fur Prods. Labeling Act,
15 U.S.C. § 69f (1964); Textile Fiber Prods. Identification Act, 15 U.S.C. § 70e (1964).
82. Federal Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 331-34, 342 (1964); Wool
Prods. Labeling Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 68e, 68h (1964); Fur Prods. Labeling Act, 15
U.S.C. §§ 69g, 69i (1964); Textile Fiber Prods. Identification Act, 15 U.S.C. §§
70f-70i (1964).
83. 15 U.S.C. § 1451 (Supp. 1966).
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ties.84 The agencies also have the power to promulgate such regula-
tions as are necessary to prevent fictitious bargains85 (e.g., abuse of
"cents-off" labeling) and to prevent nonfunctional slack-fill of pack-
ages.86 Following traditional lines, Congress vested jurisdiction over
labeling of foods, drugs, devices and cosmetics under the FDA and
jurisdiction over labeling of other consumer commodities under the
FTC.87 Congress also provided that nothing in the Fair Packaging and
Labeling Act would invalidate or supersede the FTC Act, although as
noted previously, under section 5 of the FTC Act, the FTC and the
FDA have concurrent jurisdiction over false and misleading labeling of
foods, drugs, devices and cosmetics. The FTC could, under section 5,
take action against labeling which complies with the FDA's Fair
Packaging and Labeling Act regulations.8
As a result of the Fair Packaging and Labeling Act, the FDA and
the FTC are now both working on regulations governing labeling of
consumer commodities. Since both agencies are dealing with es-
sentially the same problems, the agencies are consulting with each
other in an effort to promulgate like regulations. The FDA has taken
the lead in promulgating regulations prescribing mandatory labeling, 9
but the FDA probably will defer to the FTCs experience in -promul-
gating regulations prohibiting fictitious bargains. 0 After the regula-
tions are promulgated, investigations of compliance will have to be
made by each agency. Conceivably the FDA inspectors and the FTC
investigators may visit the same supermarket on the same day, each
looking for violations of regulations within their agency's jurisdiction.
Only one set of regulations and one group of investigators would have
been required if jurisdiction had been vested in a Department of
Consumers.
84. Id. § 1453(a)(2), 4(a) (3)(C).
85. Id. § 1454(c) (2).
86. Id. § 1454(c) (4).
87. This is the traditional dichotomy: the FDA has primary responsibility for taking
action against false and misleading labeling of foods, drugs, devices and cosmetics, and
the FTC has responsibility for taking action against false and misleading labeling of all
other consumer commodities. See notes 41-43 supra and accompanying text.
88. See id. the FTC has technical jurisdiction but generally has deferred to the FDA
in conformity with the working agreement between the agencies. '
89. The proposed FDA regulations governing foods under the Fair Packaging and
Labeling Act were published in the Federal Register of March 17, 1967. See 32 Fed.
Reg. 4172 (1967). The proposed FTC Regulations were promulgated in the Federal
Register of June 27, 1967. See 32 Fed. Reg. 9109 (1967). There were substantial
differences in the FDA and FTC initial proposals for mandatory labeling regulations
and therefore it is doubtful how much actual cooperation exists between the two
agencies.
90. The FTC has previously issued Guides Against Deceptive Pricing under the FTC
Act. See 2 T.ADE BiE. REP. II 7897 (1965). It has also investigated "cents-off" pricing
in coffee, an alleged fictitious bargain, but the FDA will probably continue this
investigation now that the Fair Packaging and Labeling Act has become law. See
Goodrich, The Issues We Face in Carrying Out the Fair Packaging and Labeling Act,
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The Fair Packaging and Labeling Act also interjects a third agency
into the regulation of packaged consumer commodities, thereby offer-
ing another example of decentralized administration of consumer pro-
tection programs. Section 5(d) of the act provides that whenever
the Secretary of Commerce determines that there is an undue pro-
liferation of weights, measures and quantities in which any packaged
consumer commodity is sold, and that the proliferation impairs the
reasonable ability of consumers to make value comparisons with
respect to such a commodity, he shall request manufacturers to de-
velop a voluntary product standard limiting such weights, measures,
and quantities.91 If the voluntary standard does not work, the De-
partment of Commerce reports the failure to Congress, which may
then enact legislation.92 To determine whether there is an undue
proliferation, the Department of Commerce will also have to send
its investigators to check in supermarkets to determine the various
package sizes in which consumer commodities are sold. Thus, there
will be investigators for three different agencies-the FDA, the FTC
and the Department of Commerce-in the nation's supermarkets look-
ing for violations of the Fair Packaging and Labeling Act, an ob.
viously wasteful procedure which could be avoided by establishing
a Department of Consumers.
In addition to these statutes which explicitly regulate mandatory
labeling and packaging of consumer products, the FTC has, through
the ubiquitious section 5 of the FTC Act, required mandatory dis-
closure of relevant facts to prevent deception of consumers in other
situations. For example, purchasers would ordinarily assume that
paperback books would contain the full text of the original edition,
93
that motor oil was made from new oil, 4 that goods offered for sale
in the United States were made in the United States,95 and that prep-
arations or devices advertised as remedies for baldness or bed-wetting
22 FooD DRUG Cosm. L.J. 158, 161-62 (1967). The FTC will probably lead in issuing
regulations governing fictitious bargains because it previously promulgated the Guides
Against Deceptive Pricing. However, the FDA will have to acquire enough of the
FTC's experience to enforce the regulations competently. This problem of trying to have
one agency acquire expertise from another is an inefficiency which would, of course,
be avoided if the two were combined in the Department of Consumers.
91. Fair Packaging and Labeling Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1454(d) (Supp. 1966).
92. Id. § 1454(e).
93. See Bantam Books, Inc. v. FTC, 275 F.2d 680 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S.
819 (1966). See also New Am. Library of World Literature, Inc. v. FTC, 213 F.2d
143 (2d Cir. 1954).
94. Kerran v. FTC, 265 F.2d 246 (10th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Double
Eagle Ref. Co. v. FTC, 361 U.S. 818 (1959); Royal Oil Corp. v. FTC, 262 F.2d 741
(4th Cir. 1959); Mohawk Ref. Corp. v. FTC, 263 F.2d 818 (3d Cir. 1958), cert.
denied, 361 U.S. 814 (1959).
95. Baldwin Bracelet Corp. v. FTC, 325 F.2d 1012 (D.C. Cir. 1963); L. Heller &
Son, Inc. v. FTC, 191 F.2d 954 (7th Cir. 1951).
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would be effective in most cases involving these problems.96 The
FTC, therefore, compels affirmative disclosure of the facts when the
contrary is true.97 Such disclosure-a type of mandatory labeling-
is clearly for consumer protection, and should also be administered
by the Department of Consumers.
Finally, under the Meat Inspection Act and Poultry Products In-
spection Act, mandatory labeling of meat and poultry products is
vested in the Department of Agriculture. These acts and their regula-
tions require generally that packaged meats and poultry bear the
common or usual name of the product, the name of the manufacturer
or packer, a statement of ingredients, and an accurate statement of
the quantity of contents.98 It is unlawful to ship these foods in inter-
state commerce without approved labeling, and criminal sanctions
can result from such shipments.99 The mandatory labeling require-
ments of these statutes are very similar to those in the Federal Food,
Drug & Cosmetic Act. Historically, administration of the Federal
Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act and the Meat Inspection Act were once
both under the Department of Agriculture.100
So far as the consumer is concerned, there is little logic in having
four different agencies enforce mandatory labeling and packaging
requirements. The consumer is equally concerned with securing ade-
quate information concerning the clothes he wears and the meat and
other food he eats and basically the same type of problems are in-
herent in such regulation. A possibility at least exists that consolida-
tion of the administration of all of these statutes in a single depart-
ment directed and oriented solely toward consumer protection would
give the consumer greater protection at a lower cost.
C. Inspection and Safety
Among the most important safeguards for consumer protection are
the statutes which authorize federal inspection of factories producing
96. See Feil v. FTC, 285 F.2d 879 (9th Cir. 1960); Ward Labs, Inc. v. FTC, 276
F.2d 952 (2d Cir.)., cert. denied, 364 U.S. 827 (1960); Keele Hair & Scalp Specialists,
Inc. v. FTC, 75 F.2d 18 (5th Cir. 1960).
97. See cases cited in notes 93-96 supra, in which such disclosure was compelled.
For additional examples of the FTCs power to compel affirmative disclosure, see 29 Fed.
Reg. 8325, 8351-53 (1964).
98. See Poultry and Poultry Prods. Inspection Act, 21 U.S.C. § 457 (1964); 9
C.F.R. § 317.2 (1967); MEAT INsPEcTION DrvIsboN, U.S. DEP'T or AGRICULTURE,
AGarcuLTuAL HANDBooK No. 3 (1965).
99. See Poultry and Poultry Prods. Inspection Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 458, 461 (1964);
Meat Inspection Law, 21 U.S.C. §§ 87-88 (1964).
100. The Food and Drug Administration was part of the Department of Agriculture
until June 30, 1940, when it was transferred to the Federal Security Administrator.
On April 11, 1953, FDA was transferred from the Federal Security Administrator to
the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare. See F.D. CosM. L. REP. II 34, at
4108 n.1 (1965). The Meat Inspection Division has remained under the Department
of Agriculture since 1907.
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certain consumer commodities, and the statutes restricting or pro-
hibiting the sale of certain unsafe consumer commodities. The factory
inspection statutes are intended to assure consumers that articles pur-
chased by them are produced under safe and clean conditions. Fac-
tory inspection also gives government inspectors an opportunity to
stop noncompliance with consumer protection statutes before con-
sumers have suffered harm. The restrictions upon the sale of unsafe
consumer commodities are intended to prevent the sale of deleterious
products, or to permit their sale only when consumers are aware of
the dangers inherent in the product. Both the factory inspection
statutes and the restrictions upon the sale of unsafe products are
essential to the safety of consumers.
The FDA has the authority under the Federal Food, Drug & Cos-
metic Act to inspect all factories, establishments or warehouses in
which foods, drugs, devices or cosmetics are manufactured, processed,
packed or held for introduction in interstate commerce.1 1 Under the
Federal Hazardous Substances Labeling Act it has authority to in-
spect all factories, warehouses and establishments in which hazardous
substances are manufactured, processed, packed or held for intro-
duction into interstate commerce.102 However, meat and meat food
products and poultry and poultry products must be inspected before
the shipment in interstate commerce by the Department of Agricul-
ture,10 3 and this Department generally has a resident inspector in meat
and poultry plants to inspect these foods. The Department of Agri-
culture inspector inspects the same conditions as an FDA inspector;1°4
therefore, the FDA generally does not inspect meat and poultry pack-
aging plants.105
101. Federal Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 374 (Supp. 1965). Two
recent Supreme Court cases, Camara v. Municipal Court, 87 Sup. Ct. 1727 (U.S. 1967)
and See v. City of Seattle, 87 Sup. Ct. 1737 (U.S. 1967) suggest that FDA may have
to secure search warrants before making factory inspections without the owner's con-
sent. Whether the inspection is voluntary or compulsory, it should, however, be made
by a Department.of Consumers.
102. Federal Hazardous Substances Labeling Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1270 (1964).
103. Meat Inspection Act, 21 U.S.C. § 72 (1964); Poultry and Poultry Prods. Inspec-
tion Act, 21 U.S.C. § 455 (1964).
104. These conditions generally concern raw materials and sanitary conditions of
the plant. See 9 C.F.R. §§ 301-40 (1967) for the scope of the Department of Agricul-
ture's inspections of meat packing plants, and 7 C.F.R. pt. 81 (1967) for the scope
of the Department of Agriculture's inspections of poultry processing plants.
105. Technically, meat and meat food products and poultry and poultry products
are exempted from the Federal Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act to the extent of the applica-
tion or extension thereto of the Meat Inspection Act and Poultry and Poultry Products
Inspection Act. Federal Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 392 (1964);
Poultry and Poultry Prods. Inspection Act, 21 U.S.C. § 467 (1964). Therefore, insofar
as inspections by the Department of Agriculture are not equivalent to Food and
Drug inspections, the FDA can send its inspectors into meat and poultry plants. How-
ever, in practice, the FDA rarely takes such action either because USDA inspectors
cover all of the conditions inspected by the FDA or, perhaps, simply because of comity
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In addition to these two agencies, the Bureau of Commercial Fish-
eries of the Department of Interior has an inspection program for
factories producing foods made from fish.10 6 Although inspection by
the Bureau of Commercial Fisheries is voluntary, the inspection is
relevant to consumer safety because the Bureau of Commercial Fish-
eries, like the Department of Agriculture and the Food and Drug
Administration, also inspects raw materials, sanitary conditions of
the plant, and finished products produced by the plant.10 7 The es-
sential similarity of the inspections performed by all three agencies
makes it desirable that the inspection authority be consolidated in a
single enforcement agency concerned primarily with consumer pro-
tection.
The fragmentation of the federal government's factory inspection
authority is contrary to its history. The factory inspection authority
in the Meat Inspection Act of 1907 has always been administered by
the Department of Agriculture. The administration of the Food and
Drugs Act of 1906 was also under the Department of Agriculture.108
While the 1906 Act contained no provision for factory inspection, the
Department of Agriculture had a voluntary inspection program in
which about 95 percent of the factory owners cooperated. 0 9 The
superseding statute, the Federal Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act of 1938,
contained express authority for factory inspections.110 The Depart-
ment of Agriculture continued to administer it and the other pro-
visions of the Federal Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act until 1940.111 The
voluntary inspection of fishery products was also administered by
the Department of Agriculture until 1956 when it was transferred to
the Bureau of Commercial Fisheries.12 Thus, the factory inspection
authority of all three different departments was originally united
under the Department of Agriculture.
between government agencies. In 1961 the FDA inspected only 14 meat processing
establishments, which also received continuous inspection by the USDA. See The
Second Citizens Advisory Committee Report, 17 FooD DRUG Cosm. L.J. 581, 666
(1962).
106. See 50 C.F.R. pt. 260 (1967).
107. Id. § 250.97-250.103.
108. See note 100 supra.
109. See H.R. No. 2139, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. (1938), in C. DUNN, Thm FEDEnAY.
FOOD, DRUG & Cos.murc Acr, A SrATEIvmT OF Irs LEGISLATi.E REcORD 815, 826.
(1938).
110. See statute cited note 101 supra.
111. See note 100 supra.
112. Fish and Wildlife Service Act, 16 U.S.C. § 742e (1964). In reviewing gen-
erally the FDA's relationship with the Department of Agriculture, the first Hoover Com-
mission stated, "Many of these authorities were once in the Department of Agriculture.
Their separation from other departmental activities in these fields causes great overlap
and also confuses the public." REroRT OF = UNrrED STATES CoM2VIssiOr oix
OnGANZATo N OF THE EXECUrVE BRANcH QF Tm GOENMENT-250- (1951). -
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A similar division of responsibility occurs in the administration of
laws restricting the sale of unsafe consumer commodities. The FDA
administers the Federal Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act which contains
a wide variety of prohibitions intended to prevent the sale of unsafe
foods, drugs, devices and cosmetics,113 and the Federal Hazardous
Substances Labeling Act which requires warning on packages of
hazardous substances which are intended or are suitable for house-
hold use.114 The Department of Agriculture, the FTC, and other
agencies administer statutes having similar purposes.
The Federal Hazardous Substances Labeling Act, administered by
the FDA, requires any packaged household product which is flam-
mable to bear a label stating "Danger" or "Warning"-"Flammable"
and describing the precautionary measures to be followed. 15 The
Flammable Fabrics Act administered by FTC, provides that the sale,
and manufacture for sale, in interstate commerce of wearing apparel
which is so highly flammable as to be dangerous when worn by indi-
viduals is an unfair method of competition and a deceptive practice."'
The standards for determining flammability are those set by the Sec-
retary of Commerce who is authorized to submit a report to Congress
with new proposals for legislation if he finds that his standards are
inadequate for the protection of the public interest." 7 A consolidation
of the functions of all three agencies-the FDA, the FTC, and the
Department of Commerce-would be possible as part of the Depart-
ment of Consumers.
Additionally, in 1965 Congress passed a statute regulating cigarette
labeling and advertising." 8 This statute requires packages of ciga-
rettes to bear the legend, "Caution-Cigarette Smoking May Be
Hazardous To Your Health."" 9 The Attorney General of the United
States, acting through the several United States attorneys, enforces
this act. 20 Meanwhile, an FTC Trade Regulation Rule governing
labeling and advertising of cigarettes is being held partly in abeyance
while Congress evaluates the effectiveness of the required warning
on cigarette packages.' 12 This Trade Regulation Rule may ultimately
govern cigarette labeling and advertising. The act also authorizes
both the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare and the FTC
113. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 321, 325, 342, 351, 361, 376, 501, 601 (1964).
114. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1261-73 (1964).
115. Id. § 126 1(p).
116. Id. §§ 1191-1200.
117. Id. § 1193.
118. Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-39 (Supp. 1966).
119. Id. § 1333.
120. See id. §§ 1335-36.
121. See 29 Fed. Reg. 8325 (1964). For the present status of the Trade Regulation
rule, see 2 TPADE RIX. REP. f 7939 (1965).
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to report such recommendations for added legislation as they deem
appropriate.=
The mandatory labeling on cigarette packages is only another re-
striction upon the sale of an unsafe product. Responsibility for en-
forcing this restriction should be in the Department of Consumers.
The Department of Consumers should also administer the Trade
Regulation Rules which may ultimately govern cigarette labeling and
advertising. There is no apparent advantage in having cigarette label-
ing regulated now by the Attorney-General and in the future by the
FTC, while both the FTC and the Department of Health, Education
and Welfare make recommendations for additional legislation. There
are advantages in combining the experience obtained in performing
all of these functions in a Department of Consumers.
The regulation of additives in foods also is subject to the jurisdiction
of two different agencies. Under the Food Additives Amendment of
1958, a food is adulterated if it contains a food additive (frequently a
chemical) which is not generally recognized as safe or is not used in
conformity with a regulation of the Food and Drug Administration.'
Under the Meat Inspection Act and Poultry and Poultry Products
Inspection Act, the Department of Agriculture inspects meat and
poultry prior to shipment in interstate commerce and certifies it as
approved for shipment.3 If the meat or poultry contains any chem-
icals which render it unhealthful or unwholesome, the inspector con-
demns the food and it is destroyed. 1' Since the inspector's decision
concerning the wholesomeness of the meat or poultry is based on
Department of Agriculture regulations, 12 6 it is clear that the De-
partment of Agriculture is performing precisely the same function
for meat and poultry as the Food and Drug Administration is perform-
ing for all other foods-it is licensing the use of chemicals in foods.
It seems likely therefore that consumers would benefit from the great-
er exchange of scientific information which would result from a con-
solidation of the food additive functions of the two agencies.
12 7
The problems of dual jurisdiction between the Department of
Agriculture and the Food and Drug Administration today also include
the determination of their respective jurisdictional lines. While it is
122. 15 U.S.C. § 1334(d) (Supp. 1966).
123. 21 U.S.C. §§ 321(s), 342(a), 348 (1964).
124. 21 U.s.c. §§ 72,455 (1964).
125. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 74,453(h), 455 (1964).
126. See 9 C.F.R. § 318.7 (1967); 7 C.F.R. § 81.95 (1967). See also Miller, Food
Additives and the Federal Meat Inspection Act, 10 FooD DrUG CosM. L.J. 762 (1955).
127. The most current and impartial study of the Food and Drug Administration
was made by the Second Citizens Advisory Committee. Although the Committee did
not study consolidation of the Meat Inspection Division of the Department of Agricul-
ture with the FDA, which is proposed in this article, it did study the relationship
between these two agencies, noting an essential similarity of interest.
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clear that foods composed entirely of meat or poultry are under the
Department of Agriculture and that foods that contain no meat or
poultry are under the FDA, there is a gray area involving foods which
contain some meat or poultry as an ingredient.128 In general, this gray
area has thus far been handled by cooperation between the two
agencies and Department of Agriculture regulations defining the scope
of its jurisdiction.m However, the possibility of a difference of
opinion between the two agencies concerning their respective juris-
dictions does exist and such a difference could result in either dual
regulation of the producer or no protection for the consumer. The
importance of jurisdictional differences would be minimized by con-
solidating the consumer protection functions of both agencies in a
Department of Consumers.
D. Government Standards
Part of the federal government's program for consumer protection
includes the promulgation and enforcement of government standards
for certain consumer products. These standards, which apply gen-
erally to foods, are intended primarily to prevent economic deception,
although some standards are of incidental assistance to government
officials in protecting the health of consumers.130 Another type of
standard of interest to consumers governs the safety of automobiles,' 3 '
but the administration of this standard has been vested in the Depart-
ment of Transportation; 3 2 therefore, it is not given detailed con-
sideration in this article.
In general, there are four types of government standards governing
foods. First, there are standards of identity which define the minimum
composition which the product must have before it can be legally sold,
128. See Miller, Federal Meat-Inspection Law, 12 FooD DRUG Cosm. L.J. 135
(1957), for a review of this gray area. While the percentage of the meat ingredient in
the food is certainly one factor considered in determining whether the food is subject
to USDA inspection, it is not the only factor, and the USDA apparently decides whether
or not the product is covered on an ad hoc basis. See id. at 138-39.
129. Id. at 137-38.
130. As indicated in § 401 of the Federal Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act, the objective
of standards of identity, quality and fill is to promote honesty and fair dealing in
the interest of consumers. 21 U.S.C. § 341 (1964). However, in promulgating stand-
ards of identity, the Food and Drug Administration may consider the expectations of
consumers concerning the nutritive values of a food and fix the standard in conformity
therewith. See Federal See. Adm'r v. Quaker Oats Co., 318 U.S. 218 (1943).
See also Forte, Definitions and Standards of Identity for Foods, 14 U.C.L.A.L. RV..
796, 802-07 (1967). The standard of identity therefore may safeguard the nutritional
values of a food. Similarly standards of fill may make certain that the consumer gets
his full quantity of the food and thus nutritive value for the purchase price. Hence,
while the primary purpose of these standards is to prevent economic cheats, they may
indirectly affect the nutrition and therefore the health of the purchasers.
131. See Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1425 (1966).
132. See 49 U.S.C. § 1651 (1966).
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except perhaps as an "imitation."' 33 Second, there are standards of
quality which define the minimum quality which products must
meet. 34 Products which fail to meet this minimum quality level can
be legally sold provided they are clearly labeled as below the govern-
ment's quality standards.'3 Third, there are standards of fill of
container which define how full the container of the product should
be. 36 Again, containers of products filled below the minimum can
be sold so long as the products are clearly labeled as substandard in
fill.137 Fourth, there are grade labeling standards which rate products
according to factors which determine consumer acceptance.138 This
type of standard generally compels informative labeling, for example,
Grade AA, A, B, or C, on eggs or, Choice, Prime, etc. on meats.139
Grade labeling standards are very different from other government
standards because producers are not compelled to have their products
rated according to grade labeling standards'4" and because instead
of prescribing a minimum level of acceptability and outlawing all
products below that level or permitting their sale only if labeled
substandard, grade labeling standards prescribe a number of different
classifications into which the food may fit. The goal of grade labeling
is to offer fairly specific information to consumers which will assist
them in making purchases.
Standards of identity, quality and fill of containers are promulgated
and enforced by the Food and Drug Administration for all foods
except meat and poultry food products.' 41 Standards similar to
standards of identity for meat and poultry food products have been
promulgated by the Department of Agriculture.'4 The Food and
133. See Federal Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 341, 343(g) (1964).
See also Federal Sec. Adm'r v. Quaker Oats Co., 318 U.S. 218 (1943) and 62 Cases
of Jam v. United States, 340 U.S. 593 (1951).
134. See Federal Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 343(h) (1964).
135. See id. See also 21 C.F.R. § 10.7(a) (1967).
136. See Federal Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 341 (1964). See
also Forte, The Food and Drug Administration, The Federal Trade Commission and
the Deceptive Packaging of Foods, 40 N.Y.U.L. REv. 860, 863-64 (1965).
137. See id. and 21 C.F.R. § 10.7(b) (1967).
138. See7 C.F.R. pts. 51-56 (1967).
139. See, e.g., 7 C.F.R. §§ 53.103, 56.216 (1967).
140. When standards of identity, quality and fill are promulgated for a food, all
producers immediately become subject to the standards. See Federal Food, Drug &
Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 341, 343(g)(h) (1964). However, the statute authorizing
grade labeling standards expressly states "* . . that no person shall be required to use
the service authorized by this subsection." 7 U.S.C. § 1622 (1964).
141. See Federal Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. 341 (1964).
142. See 9 C.F.R. § 317.8 (1967); 7 C.F.R. §§ 81.131, 81.134 (1967); Miller,
Federal Meat Inspection Act, 11 FOOD DRuG Cosar. L.J. 565, 569-70 (1956). However,
the Department of Agriculture has not been quite so successful as the FDA in convincing
the courts that all foods which fail to comply with its standards of identity must be
labeled imitations. See Armour & Co. v. Freeman, 304 F.2d 404 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 370 U.S. 920 (1962).
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Drug Administration has no authority to prescribe grade labeling
standards for any products. 14 3 That authority, insofar as it relates to
agricultural products, is in the Department of Agriculture. 144' Grade
labeling, insofar as it relates to fish products, is administered by the
Bureau of Commercial Fisheries of the Department of Interior.145
There are no grade labeling standards for other foods.
146
The administration of all of the above standards was originally
centralized under the Department of Agriculture and was later
dispersed among these other agencies.147 This dispersal of the adminis-
tration of government standards affords no discernable advantage to
consumers, and there are several evident disadvantages. These in-
clude a reduced opportunity to shift personnel to activities having
greater priority for the protection of consumer interests and a reduced
opportunity to interchange information about related subjects among
such personnel. A consolidation of these activities in a Department
of Consumers would be consistent with their original administration
by a single department of the federal government and would cause
no discernable, significant disadvantage to the government.
Finally, intimately related to the government standards program
are some of the trade practice rules of the Federal Trade Commis-
sion promulgated in connection with section 5 of the FTC Act
(prohibiting unfair acts and deceptive practices). These rules (which
143. While consumers believe that grade labeling would permit a more intelligent
choice and reduce the "economic waste" in advertising, industry has always been
opposed, and it may be feared that grade labeling would impede research and de-
velopment in new food products. Precedent for this fear can be found in the FDA's un-
successful attempts to outlaw artificially sweetened soft-drinks and other foods as
recently as the early 1950's, despite the consumer demand for such products. See, e.g.,
United States v. 70 Gross Bottles of Quenchies, (S.D. Ohio 1952), in V. KLEINVELD &
C. DuNx, FEDmuL FooD, DRUG & Cosm. ACT-JuDicIAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE Raconn
1951-1952, at 141 (1953).
144. Agricultural Marketing Act of 1946, 7 U.S.C. § 1622(h) (1964).
145. 16 U.S.C. § 742e (1964). See also 50 C.F.R. §§ 261-72 (1967).
146. Many of the USDA's grade labeling standards apply to fresh fruits and vegetables.
See 7 C.F.R. pt. 51 (1967). The FDA does not have the authority to fix definitions and
standards of quality for these foods. Federal Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act, § 401, 21
U.S.C. § 341 (1964). This considerably reduces the overlap between the two agencies.
See Second Citizens Advisory Committee Report on The Food and Drug Administration,
17 FooD DRUG Cosm. L.J. 581, 668 (1962). However, both agencies can set standards
for processed fruits and vegetables. Hence, for example, there are standards of
identity, standards of quality, standards of fill and grade labeling standards for canned
peas. See 21 C.F.R. § 51.2 (1967) and 7 C.F.R. § 52.2281 (1967). The grade label-
ing standards are administered by the USDA and other standards by the FDA.
147. See notes 108-12 supra. One witness described the effects of the dispersal as
follows: "It is patently absurd to have standards laid down for fish fillets by one
department-Interior-for meat by another department-Agriculture-for many other
food products by the Food and Drug Administration while on the flank the Federal
Trade Commission is establishing standards for advertising these products-sometimes
even standards which bridge on product identity." House Hearings 39-40.
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are advisory rather than compulsory) are very similar to some of
the standards of identity'" and standards of fill of container 49
promulgated by FDA. Some of these rules even govern the same
products. Thus, situations arise in which the same practice for the
same product is prohibited by two almost identical rules-one ad-
ministered by the FDA and the other by the FTC.5 0 The FTC gener-
ally defers to the FDA in the regulation of the labeling and packaging
of the product but reserves the right to regulate advertising.' 51 How-
ever, there is no legal barrier to FTC action against producers for
violations of trade practice rules which govern labeling; hence, pro-
ducers are, theoretically at least, open to legal action by both the FDA
and the FTC for the same offense. Consolidation of the FDA and the
FTC's section 5 power over unfair acts and deceptive practices relating
to the composition and packaging of foods would eliminate the
possibility of double liability of producers for such practices. 15 2
III. THE PROBLEMS OF CONSOLIDATION
Foremost among the problems of consolidation are the problems
raised by the omniscient jurisdiction and quasi-judicial structure of
the FTC. Today the FTC's jurisdiction extends to the FTC Act
(unfair methods of competition or unfair or deceptive acts or prac-
tices),153 the Clayton Act, as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act
(unlawful discrimination in price and in services and facilities and
148. See Trade Practice Rules for the Tomato Paste Industry, 16 C.F.R. § 133.2
(1967); Trade Practice Rules for Preserve Manufacturing, 16 C.F.R. § 114.1 (1967);
Trade Practice Rules for the Tuna Industry, 16 C.F.R. § 146.1 (1967). See also Trade
Practice Rules for Macaroni and Noodle Prods. Industry, 16 C.F.R. § 132.5 (1967).
The FTC's Trade Practice- Rules-which are similar to-standards of identity are reviewed
in greater detail in GuNDEO:si, GUNDERSON & FEaRGusoiN, FOOD STANDARnS AND DE-
FINIONS IN THE UNITED STATES-A GUIDEBOOK 119-24 (1963).
149. Trade practice rules similar to standards of fill are reviewed in Forte, The
Food and Drug Administration, The Federal Trade Commission and The Deceptive
Packaging of Foods, 40 N.Y.U.L. REv. 860, 879 n.94 (1965).
150. E.g., compare the Trade Practice Rules for the Preserve Manufacturing Indus-
try, 16 C.F.R. § 114.1 (1967), with the standard of identity for preserves, 21 C.F.R.
§ 29.3 (1967). Both require 45% fruit in preserves. A manufacturer who used a
lesser percentage of fruit in preserves would therefore be in violation of both the trade
practice rule and standard of identity and would be, theoretically at least, subject to
legal action by both agencies.
151. See the working agreement between the two agencies, 3 TRADE REG. RF. [
9850.03 (1965) and Forte, The Food and Drug Administration, The Federal Trade
Commission and the Deceptive Packaging of Foods, 40 N.Y.U.L. REv. 860, 862 n.8
(1965).
152. As the Second Hoover Commission stated, "... it violates common sense that
two or more agencies should exercise the same type of authority over the same
matter," BEInoT OF Tm UNrran STATES Co, rsso oN TH ORGANIZATION OF THE
EXECUTIVE BRANcH OF THE GOVERNMENT-LEGAL SERvicEs AND PROcEDuRE 47 (1965).
153. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1964).
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unlawful mergers),'54 the various Textile Fabric, 15 Wool, 156 and Fur
Products Labeling'57 Acts and certain other less prominent statutes.15 8
While some of these statutes (e.g., the Textile and Fur Products
Labeling Acts) ate primarily consumer protection statutes similar to
the Federal Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act, other statutes (e.g., the
Robinson-Patman Act) are primarily for the protection of small
businesses or are more similar to the statutes enforced by the
Justice Department. Therefore, it would seem desirable to transfer
the FTC's jurisdiction over consumer protection statutes to the De-
partment of Consumers and to transfer its antitrust and price dis-
crimination authority to the Department of Justice.
A possible division of the FTC's responsibilities between the De-
partment of Consumers and the Department of Justice is:
A. The Department of Consumers
1. Textile Fiber Products Identification Act'5 9
2. Wool Products Labeling Act 6 °
3. Fur Products Labeling Act' 61
4. Flammable Fabrics Act'
62
5. Section 5 of the FTC Act insofar as it relates to unfair or
deceptive acts or practices in commerce.
163
6. Wheeler-Lea Act prohibitions against false and misleading
advertising of foods, drugs, devices and cosmetics.1
7. The Lanham Trade-Mark Act of 1946165
8. Fair Packaging and Labeling Act 16
B. The Department of Justice
1. The Clayton Act
167
2. Robinson-Patman Act 68
3. Webb-Pomerene Act 69
154. 21 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1964).
155. 15 U.S.C. §§ 70-70k (Supp. 1966).
156. 15 U.S.C. §§ 68-68j (1964).
157. 15 U.S.C. §§ 69-69j (1964).
158. Laws administered by the FTC are summarized in Federal Trade Commission
Rule 1.1, 16 C.F.R. 1.1 (1967).
159. See note 155 supra.
160. See note 156 supra.
161. See note 157 supra.
162. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1191-1200 (1964).
163. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1964).
164. Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 53-55 (1964).
165. The FTC has the power under this Act to cancel deceptive trademarks. See Lan-
ham Trade-Mark Act of 1946, 15 U.S.C. § 1064 (1964).
166. 15 U.S.C. § 1551 (Supp. 1966).
167. See note 154 supra.
168. 15 U.S.C. §§ 13-13b, 21a (1964).
169. 15 U.S.C. §§ 61-65 (1964).
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4. Section 5 of the FTC Act insofar as it relates to unfair methods
of competition in commerce."'
This division of responsibility would consolidate the antitrust re-
sponsibilities of the FTC and the Department of Justice. Such a
consolidation may be desirable per se, 171 quite apart from the benefits
which would be derived from the consolidation of the administration
of consumer protection statutes in the Department of Consumers.
The most radical part of this division of responsibility would be
the split of section 5 of the FTC Act, giving unfair or deceptive acts
or practices to the Department of Consumers and unfair methods of
competition to the Department of Justice. Such a split would require
careful study. However, there are some factors which indicate that
this division of responsibility may be both feasible and desirable.
Section 5, as enacted in 1914, prohibited only unfair methods of
competition in con-merce. The additional prohibitions against the
use of unfair or deceptive acts or practices in commerce were enacted
in 1938 as part of the Wheeler-Lea Act. The intent of Congress
originally in enacting the 1914 statute was to provide greater flexibility
in dealing with antitrust violations. 7 2 The Supreme Court has held
that the prohibition against unfair methods of competition includes
only methods which injuriously affect a competitor's business. 173 Con-
versely, in enacting the prohibition against unfair acts and deceptive
practices in commerce Congress intended to provide a remedy when
the wrong was to the public rather than to competitors. 7 4 It is the
170. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1964).
171. The consolidation of the FTC's and the Department of Justice's antitrust respon-
sibilities would eliminate problems of dual jurisdiction (e.g., indecision over which agency
will handle particular cases) and promote cooperation and increased communications be-
tween all personnel working on antitrust cases. The need for a better relationship
between the FTC and the Department of Justice was recently reviewed by Philip
Elman, member of the Federal Trade Commission, in Elman, Antitrust Enforcement:
Retrospect and Prospect, 53 A.B.AJ. 609 (1967). Commissioner Elman noted that
the FTC's and the Department of Justice's responsibilities are concurrent and over-
lapping and that the area of overlap, on paper at least, is very extensive indeed.
He suggested a more meaningful relationship was needed between these two agencies
and stated, "What is called for is a merger of the two agencies' respective resources
and skills. They should form a joint venture or partnership for antitrst enforcement."
Id. at 611. While Commissioner Elman did not suggest merging the FTC's antitrust
responsibilities into the Department of Justice, this would seem to be one method
of achieving such a partnership.
172. See Elman, The Federal Trade Commission and the Administrative Process, 8
ANrTmusr BuLL. 607, 609 (1963), and text accompanying notes 51-52 supra.
173. FTC v. Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643 (1931).
174. See H.R. REP'. No. 1613, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937) stating: "By the
proposed amendment to Section 5, the Commission can prevent such acts or practices
which injuriously affect the general public as well as those which are unfair to com-
petitors. In other words, this amendment makes the consumer who may be injured
by an unfair trade practice of equal concern before the law with the merchant or
manufacturer injured by the unfair methods of a dishonest competitor." C. DUN.N,
WHEELEr-LEA AcT, A STATEmENT OF ITS LEGrSLATvE REcoRD 167 (1938).
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prohibition against use of unfair or deceptive acts or practices in
commerce which was intended to give the FTC clear power to prevent
all consumer cheats, although the FTC had previously assumed the
power to regulate false and misleading advertising. Concurrent trans-
fer to the Department of Consumers of the power to regulate unfair
or deceptive acts or practices and the other Wheeler-Lea Act pro-
hibitions against false and misleading advertising of foods, drugs,
devices and cosmetics would probably make it plain that the con-
gressional intent is to vest all of the power to deal with frauds
upon the public in the Department of Consumers rather than the
Department of Justice.
Inevitably, there is, of course, some duplication in the power to
prevent unfair methods of competition (which would be vested in
the Department of Justice) and in the power to prevent unfair acts
and deceptive practices (which would be vested in the Department
of Consumers). However, given the proper legislative history, the
lines of demarcation between these two departments would be rea-
sonably clearY 5 In addition, the Department of Justice has tradi-
tionally been antitrust-oriented whereas the Department of Consumers
would probably be deceptive practice-oriented, and the likelihood of
175. Deceptive acts or practices are controlled by a simple legal standard: "If the
seller attempts to deceive the consumer in any particular which could influence the
latter's buying choice-if in other words, he uses any false inducement-he has com-
mitted a deceptive act or practice in violation of Section 5." 29 Fed Reg. 8325,
8350 (1964). This power to regulate such practices should clearly be in the De-
partment of Consumers, and there is little difficulty in separating it from the rest of
§ 5. The line of demarcation becomes less clear between unfair methods of com-
petition and unfair acts or practices. What is desired is to give the Department of
Justice power to prohibit those acts or practices which have been prohibited primarily
because of their unfairness to competitors and to give the Department of Consumers
power to prohibit acts or practices which have been prohibited primarily because
of their unfairness to consumers. There is a distinction between the two, and the
FTC has listed many examples falling in each category. Id. at 8354-55. A similar but
more complete list could be incorporated in the committee reports on the bill to
transfer the FTC's functions to the Department of Consumers and the Department of
Justice. This list would serve as a guide to the departments and the courts in handling
any immediate jurisdictional problems and as a reference to use in determining which
department would handle new types of offenses in the future. Such a list would not
be wholly consistent with those practices which have been termed "unfair methods of
competition" or "unfair acts or practices" under existing law. "Unfair acts or practices"
has in the past included acts which are unfair either to competitors or to consumers.
See id. By dividing jurisdiction and listing offenses which are primarily injurious to
business as "unfair method of competition" and offenses which are primarily injurious
to consumers as "unfair acts or practices," we would be broadening the former and
narrowing the latter. In dividing responsibility, a careful review should be made of
the internal guidelines for division of responsibility within the FTC today. The FTC's
three regulatory bureaus are the Bureau of Deceptive Practices, the Bureau of Restraint
of Trade, and the Bureau of Textiles and Furs. See 3 TRADE REG. RL,. ff 9555 (1965).
It seems quite possible that the proper division of responsibility would be to assign the
functions of the Bureaus of Deceptive Practices and Textiles and Furs to the Depart-




these two departments having a conflict in jurisdiction seems relatively
slight.
There are, of course, definite advantages to retaining the present
language of section 5 and splitting it between the Department of
Consumers and the Department of Justice as opposed to drafting
new statutory powers for these two departments. The prohibition
against unfair methods of competition has benefited from over fifty
years of judicial interpretation while the prohibition against unfair
or deceptive acts or practices has benefited from almost thirty years
of judicial interpretation. The courts generally have interpreted
section 5 so that it both supplements our antitrust law and provides
protection against cheats of consumers. All of the precedents would
be nullified if, instead of retaining the section 5 language, new
statutory powers were drafted for these agencies.
The existing language of section 5 has also been demonstrated to
have the principal qualities needed to supplement the antitrust laws
and to provide efficient consumer protection, namely the qualities
of breadth and flexibility."76 Breadth and flexibility are needed for
supplementation of the antitrust laws because specific offenses are
already prohibited and the additional protection required is a general
statute upon which the Department of Justice can rely in acting
against other anti-competitive practices. 177 Breadth and flexibility are
also needed in preventing consumer cheats because experience has
shown that there are infinite ways for the swindler to take advantage
of the consumer.178 The phrase "unfair or deceptive acts or practices"
has proved effective to prevent such cheats, and it would be difficult
to find more appropriate language. On balance then, it seems ad-
visable to retain the present language of section 5 if a Department of
Consumers is established rather than to attempt a redraft of pro-
hibitions in order to eliminate any possibility of concurrent jurisdiction
between the Department of Consumers and the Department of Justice.
176. See FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374, 384-86 (1965); FTC v.
Bunte Bros. Inc., 312 U.S. 349, 353-55 (1941).
177. See, e.g., Atlantic Ref. Co. v. FTC, 381 U.S. 357, 369-71 (1965), in which
the Supreme Court noted that there were many unfair methods of competition which
do not rise to the level of antitrust violations, but which the FTC can prevent if
they have the characteristics of antitrust violations.
178. When Congress originally prohibited "unfair methods of competition" it con-
cluded these methods could not be defined because they were too numerous and
because the most complete definition of these methods would be frustrated by the
ingenuity of unscrupulous persons in inventing new unfair trade practices. See S. RP.
No. 597, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. (1914) and H.R. REP. No. 1142, 63d Cong., 2d Sess.
(1914), in Kelley and Cassedy, The Federal Trade Commission Act as Amended by the
Wheeler-Lea Act, 2 FooD DRUG CosM. L.Q. 315, 319-20 (1947). The same situation
prevails today and, as shown by FTC v. Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643 (1931), some con-




The division of the FTC's responsibility between the Department
of Consumers and the Department of Justice would be complicated
by the quasi-judicial structure of the FTC. Again, however, these
problems are not insurmountable. The FTC now prosecutes viola-
tions of many of its statutes by means of cease and desist orders.17 9
These orders are issued by hearing examiners; appeal can then be
taken to the FTC itself, which either affirms or reverses the issuance
of the cease and desist order.180 The result is that the FTC which
originally issued the complaint and prosecuted the action then decides
whether its complaint was justified. There is thus a combination
of the investigatory, prosecutory and adjudicative functions in a
single agency. While appeals from the FTC's decisions can be taken
to the courts, the courts have traditionally viewed the FTC as an
expert body and have therefore given a wide latitude to the FTC
in both its findings of facts and conclusions of law. 8" For many
respondents, the FTC's decision, for better or worse, becomes the
final decision in the case. It is not surprising that under these cir-
cumstances respondents question whether they have received a fair
trial and decision.182
Assuming that the FTC's administrative responsibilities were split
between the Department of Consumers and the Department of
Justice, it would then be possible to create a separate independent
body which could issue cease and desist orders similar to those now
issued by the FTC. This body would logically consist of the Hearing
Examiners of the FTC plus the FTC Commissioners. It could be
named either the Trade Court or the Federal Trade Commission.
However, the essence of the arrangement would be to consolidate all
of the investigatory and prosecutory responsibilities of the FTC in the
Department of Consumers and the Department of Justice, and to
place all of the adjudicative responsibilities of the FTC in a separate
and independent agency.183 Support for the "Trade Court" concept
179. The issuance of these orders is authorized by Federal Trade Commission Act §
5, 15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (1964).
180. See FTC Rules §§ 3.22-3.24 in 16 C.F.R. §§ 3.22-3.24 (1967) and Clark, The
Judicial Functions of the Federal Trade Commission Should Be Transferred to the
District Courts, 10 ABA AuNRmUsT SECTION 51, 58-65 (1957) for a criticism of
this procedure.
181. See, e.g., FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374 (1965). See also FTC
v. Mary Carter Paint Co., 382 U.S. 46 (1965).
182. See Barton, The Federal Trade Commission and the Need For Procedural
Impartiality, 64 CoLum. L. RFv. 390 (1964), for examples of instances in which
respondents believe they did not receive a fair trial and decision.
183. If such an independent body were constituted, provision might be made for
the use of one of the examiners of that body at the FDA hearings. Complaints of
procedural unfairness have not been limited to the FTC in the past; some have com-
plained that the FDA Hearing Examiner (being an employee of the Food and Drug
Administration) also could not be wholly impartial. See Kleinfield, The Problems of
Advocacy in Food and Drug Litigation, 17 FooD DRuG Cosm. L.J. 404, 413-14 (1962).
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has in the past been voiced by the American Bar Association'8 and
the Hoover Task Force Comnission.'S The suggestion is therefore
neither new nor radical. In the context of creating a Department
of Consumers, the intent of the proposal is not to "break up the FTC"
but rather to give greater consumer protection through a new agency.
Problems will also arise in drafting legislation which will transfer
consumer protection functions of agencies other than the FTC to the
Department of Consumers. In addition to the FTC functions described
above, it would seem desirable for the reasons stated in part I of
this article to transfer to the Department of Consumers the following
regulatory authority: all of the Department of Agriculture's authority
under the Meat Inspection Act and Poultry and Poultry Products
Act; all functions of the Department of Agriculture relating to grading
of foods sold to consumers; all functions of the Department of Com-
merce under the Fair Packaging and Labeling Act and the Flammable
Fabrics Act; all functions of the Department of Interior which relate
to the inspection and grading of fish and fish products; and all
functions of the Attorney-General (and U. S. attorneys), the FTC
and the Department of Health, Education & Welfare under the
Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Statute, in addition to the agencies
which would presently be transferred by this bill.
8 6
The transfer of some of these functions will be relatively easy, but
the transfer of others will require careful draftsmanship. Care will
be needed particularly where the approach is to transfer part of an
agency's function under a statute. For example, under the Agricultural
Marketing Act of 1964, the Secretary of Agriculture is authorized to
and has promulgated standards for agricultural products to aid trading
While there has been some improvement under the FDA's new Rules of Practice, see
Spiker and Stafford, A Look at FDA's New Rules of Practice-and Problems Still
Unsolved, 21 FooD Dnuc CosM. L.J. 448 (1966), it would still be preferable to have a
more independent Hearing Examiner. This could be accomplished by permitting one
of the examiners from the Trade Court to preside at FDA Hearings.
184. See ABA, REPORT OF THE SPECIAL CommrrrEE ON SERvicEs AND PROCEDURE 42
(1956), which recommended the "Trade Court" concept. The House of Delegates
approved this recommendation in February, 1956. See Clark, supra note 180, at 82.
The history of the administrative court concept is reviewed at Lorch, The Federal Ad-
ministrative Court Idea, 52 A.B.A.J. 635 (1966).
185. COmmIssION ON ORGANIZATION OF THE EXECUTIvE BRANCH OF TE GOVERN-
MENT, TASK FORCE REPORT ON LEGAL SERvicEs AND PROCEDURES 246-50 (1955). The
Hoover Commission itself recommended that Congress look into the feasibility of this
proposal. See Com2n.sssON ON THE ORGANIzATION OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF TE
GOVERNMENT, REPORT ON LEGAL SERVICES AND PROCEDURE 85-95 (1965).
186. The first Hoover Commission also recommended the transfer of certain labeling
statutes governing oleomargarine, filled cheese, and renovated butter, then administered
by the Internal Revenue Service, to the Food and Drug Administration. See REPORT
OF THE COMMSSrON ON THE ORGANIZATION OF THE ExEcuT=v BRANCH OF THE
GovERNMENT 250-51 (1951). These statutes are a minor part of our labeling law
and little time and expense is needed to administer them. It would be possible to
transfer the administration of these statutes to the Department of Consumers.
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in these products and to help consumers obtain the quality of products
they desire. Some of the standards promulgated are apparently de-
signed primarily for assistance to consumers (as, for example, United
States Consumer Standards for Cranberries),187 and some are appar-
ently designed primarily for assistance to producers (as, for example,
United States Standards for Fresh Cranberries for Processing).188
Other standards are not identified as either standards for consumers or
processors and apparently guide both groups.189
A thorough study of all of the standards promulgated by the De-
partment of Agriculture will be required to determine whether
jurisdiction over each standard should be in the Department of
Agriculture or the Department of Commerce.190 Grade labeling has,
so far as consumers are concerned, been rather ineffective and every
effort should be made to give jurisdiction to the Department of
Consumers to develop standards which are meaningful to consumers
and to educate consumers concerning them.191 Care must also be
taken in transferring responsibilities from existing agencies to the
new department to make certain that there is no abatement of
presently pending litigation. This will also require careful drafts-
manship.
Other problems of consolidation involve primarily problems result-
ing from a shifting of functions from existing agencies to the Depart-
ment of Consumers. For example, it has been argued that the
shift of the FDA will separate it from the United States Public Health
Service and make it more difficult to secure the scientific research
needed for the FDA's administration of its responsibilities.192 How-
ever, the FDA has been increasing its scientific staff and therefore the
force of this objection is somewhat mitigated.193 Additionally, rela-
187. 7 C.F.R. § 51.2775 (1967).
188. 7 C.F.R. § 51.3030 (1967).
189. See, e.g., United States Standards for Canned Grapefruit, 7 C.F.R. § 52,1141
(1967).
190. The United States Standards for Hay and Straw, 7 C.F.R. pt. 57 (1967), should
remain under the jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture because they have no
application to consumer products. However, general standards for fruits, vegetables and
meats intended for the guidance of both producers and consumers should be admin-
istered by the Department of Consumers.
191. Many consumers do not understand the grades used by the Department of
Agriculture nor do they give much attention to these grades as they shop. This may
be because the grades are not designed to facilitate consumer understanding, or
because the Department of Agriculture has not sufficiently promoted their grade label-
ing standards to bring them to the attention of consumers. See House Hearings 54.
192. See, e.g., Senate Hearings 102.
193. See House Hearings 77-78; Harvey, Report on the Growth, Organization, Opera-
tion and Plans of the FDA, 19 FooD DRuG Cosar. L.J. 590 (1964). This upgrading of
the scientific function of the FDA was recommended in the Second Citizens Advisory
Committee Report on the Food and Drug Administration, 17 FooD Dauc Cosm. L.J.
581, 601 (1962).
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tionships between the FDA and the Public Health Service have not
been particularly cooperative. 94 The objection that exchange of
information will become more difficult if functions are removed from
existing government agencies must also be weighed against the
benefits of consolidation, including the increased exchange of infor-
mation which would result from the consolidation of some of the
personnel of these different agencies in the Department of Consumers.
On balance, it is submitted that a more valuable flow of information
would result from the establishment of a Department of Consumers
than from the present decentralized state of the government agencies
engaged in consumer protection activities. Hence the consolidation
seems desirable, even while recognizing that the personnel of the new
department will have to consult with members of other government
departments to secure the scientific research and other information
needed efficiently to fulfill their new responsibilities. 19
Finally, the consolidation of consumer protection programs in a
Department of Consumers will result in complex management prob-
lems for the executive branch of the government. These problems
include such mundane matters as persuading Congress to appropriate
sufficient funds adequately to administer the new department, finding
offices (both in Washington, D.C., and elsewhere) for an entire new
department of the federal government, segregating and transferring
relevant files to the department, finding competent consumer-oriented
personnel to administer the higher offices of the department, transfer-
ring personnel engaged in existing consumer protection programs to
the department, building high morale among the transferred per-
194. See The Second Citizens Advisory Committee Report on The Food and Drug
Administration, 17 FooD DRUG Cosm. L.J. 591, 675 (1962), stating, "Even within
HEW, there are disturbing jurisdictional questions regarding matters connected with
consumer protection; there seems to be a noticeable lack of coordination between FDA
and PHS in particular." See also id. at 644 and note 195 infra.
195. In evaluating the argument that creation of a Department of Consumers will
disturb cooperative relationships among government agencies, it should be noted
that the present relationships among these agencies are not idyllic. In 1955, the first
Citizens Advisory Report on the Food and Drug Administration noted, "There
is some evidence of lack of cooperation among agencies and within the Department
of Health, Education and Welfare, there could be more cooperative effort at times
between the FDA and the Public Health Service in regard to the use of laboratory
facilities in the field." Report by the Citizens Advisory Committee on the Food and
Drug Administration, 10 FoOD DRuG CosM. L.J. 453, 516 (1955). Apparently there
has been a further deterioration of relationships among these agencies since 1955. In
1962, when a Citizens Advisory Committee again studied the Food and Drug Adminis-
tration, it concluded: "Cooperation among federal agencies is not better; it seems
to be less satisfactory now than it was five years ago. Most of the agencies concerned
have grown considerably, as has FDA, and it is primarily this growth which has
lessened cooperation, as the overlapping of functions has increased and numerous
agencies find themselves working on different facets of a single problem without clear
guidelines for the coordination of their activities." See The Second Citizens Advisory




sonnel, preparing internal procedures defining the respective functions
and responsibilities within the department, and arranging liaison with
other related departments of the federal, state, and local governments.
While these problems may be generally temporary in nature, they
cannot be overlooked since they will have a substantial and immedi-
ate effect upon consumer protection in the United States and upon
consumers' attitudes toward the new department.
IV. CONCLUSION
The 1950's and early 1960's saw the enactment of an almost unpre-
cedented volume of consumer protection legislation.196 Among the
landmark statutes passed during these years were: the Federal Hazard-
ous Substances Labeling Act,1 7 the National Traffic and Motor
Vehicle Safety Act,198 the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising
Act,19 9 the Fair Packaging and Labeling Act,20 the Kefauver-Harris
Drug Amendments,20' the Food and Color Additives Amendments to
the Federal Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act,202 the Pesticide Chemicals
Act,20 3 the Poultry Products Inspection Act 4 and the Textile Fiber
Products Identification Act.205 At the same time, there was a discern-
able increase in the influence of the consumer upon the executive
branch of the government and this influence was institutionalized in
the President's appointment of a Consumers' Advisory Committee, a
Committee on Consumer Interests, and a Special Assistant to the
196. Legislative protection of the consumer seems to be a cyclic phenomenon. There
are three significant eras of consumer protection legislation in the United States. The
first, beginning in the late 1800's and continuing into the early 1900's, includes the
Sherman Act of 1890, 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1964); the
Food and Drugs Act of 1906, 34 Stat. 768 (repealed, 52 Stat. 1059 (1938)); the Meat
Inspection Act of 1907, 34 Stat. 1260, as amended, 21 U.S.C. §§ 71-91 (1964); and
the Federal Trade Commission and Clayton Acts of 1914, 38 Stat. 717 (1914), as
amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-46, 47-58 (1964), and 38 Stat. 730 (1914), as amended,
15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1964). The second, beginning in the early and extending
through the late 1930's includes the Robinson-Patman Act of 1936, 49 Stat. 1526,
15 U.S.C. §§ 13-13b, 21a (1964); the Federal Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act of 1938, 52
Stat. 1040, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-92 (1964); and the Wheeler-Lea Act of 1938, 52 Stat.
111. The third era, beginning in the 1950's, is still continuing. Among the statutes
enacted during this period were: the Fur Products Labeling Act of 1951, 65 Stat.
175, 15 U.S.C. §§ 69-69i (1964); the Child Protection Act of 1966, 80 Stat. 1305,
15 U.S.C. § 1261 (Supp. 1966); and the Drug Abuse Control Amendments of 1965,
79 Stat. 226 (codified in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C. §§ 321 et seq. (Suop. 1966).
This era may yet include the proposed "truth-in-lending" bill and the bill to create
a Department of Consumers.
197. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1261-73 (1964).
198. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1425 (Supp. 1966).
199. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-39 (Supp. 1966).
200. 21 U.S.C. § 1451 (Supp. 1966).
201. 21 U.S.C. § 321 (1964).
202. 21 U.S.C. § 342 (1964).
203. 21 U.S.C. § 346(a) (1964).
204. 21 U.S.C. §§ 451-69 (Supp. 1966).
205. 15 U.S.C. §§ 70-70k (Supp. 1966).
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President for Consumer Affairs. 206 Both Norway and Sweden have
reportedly established Ministeries of the Consumer and Family Af-
fair;207 and, on the state level in this country, Connecticut has estab-
lished a Department of Consumer Protection.2 8 Those who believe
that history portends the future thus have ample reason to believe that
ultimately a Department of Consumers will be established in the
United States.
In reviewing the consumer protection programs of the federal
government, it quickly becomes apparent that there is no logic to
the present division of responsibility among government agencies.
The present division of responsibility is purely an anachronism,
grounded in history, maintained by inertia, and defended only by
the political influence of the agencies presently engaged in consumer
protection programs.209
The strength of the Department of Consumers concept is that it
offers an alternative to a patently indefensible division of responsi-
bility among government agencies.2 10 The alternative is simple and
206. See Barber, Government and the Consumer, 64 MiCH. L. REv. 1203, 1213-14
(1966), for a review of the functions of the Consumers' Advisory Council, the Com-
mittee on Consumer Interests and the President's Special Assistant for Consumer Affairs.
Mr. Barber's view is that the single most important weakness in all of these is their lack
of authority. Id. The increase in the influence of consumers upon the executive branch
of the government was also reflected by President Johnson's recent order giving the
Committee on Consumer Interests an upgrading to cabinet status. Exec. Order No.
11349, 32 Fed. Reg. 6759 (May 3, 1967). However, the Committee still has no
administrative responsibilities for the operation of consumer protection programs;
thus it is primarily a group to study and to make recommendations on matters relating
to consumer affairs and consumer interests.
207. House Hearings, 39, 153.
208. CONN. GIEN. STAT. § 19-170 through § 19-210 (1960). The Connecticut De-
partment has reportedly made its regulatory officials more consumer oriented than
industry oriented. House Hearings 42-43.
The Connecticut Department of Consumer Protection administers both the Con-
necticut Food and Drug Act and a Connecticut statute prohibiting deceptive practices.
See CoNx. GEN_. STAT. § 42-115 (a)(g) (Supp. 1966). The Food and Drug Act is
enforced by injunctions, criminal penalties and seizures. See id. at § 19-214 through
§19-216. The Deceptive Practices Statute is enforced by cease and desist orders. Thus,
Connecticut has done something on the state level similar to merging the FDA and the
FTC in a Department of Consumers.
209. The political influence of administrative agencies is not limited to lobbying in
its ordinary sense. These agencies have a constant opportunity to influence the
executive and legislative arms of the government by reports circulated both in writing
and made verbally at cabinet and other meetings, and by testimony before Congress.
No private lobbyist can or does have the same opportunity to influence the govern-
ment as do these official members of the "government family."
210. The bill to establish a Department of Consumers does not provide for the
consolidation of the consumer protection programs of the FDA, the FTC, the Depart-
ment of Agriculture and the Bureau of Commercial Fisheries. However, the bill in this
respect is lagging far behind consumer spokesmen. They recognize the illogic of
the present division of responsibility; they believe it is impeding progress in consumer




direct-a consolidation of consumer protection programs in a single
new department-but the implementation of this alternative is fraught
with difficulty. The FDA and the FTC are the principal agencies
involved in the enforcement of consumer protection statutes and
the consumer protection activities of both of these agencies should
be merged into the Department of Consumers. Such a merger is com-
plicated by two factors: (1) the FTC performs quasi-judicial as
well as administrative functions, and (2) the FTC administers anti-
trust as well as consumer protection activities. Assuming the FTC's
consumer protection programs were merged into a Department of
Consumers, we would be left with the problem of where to place
the FTC's quasi-judicial functions and its antitrust responsibilities.
A possible solution seems to be to assign the FTC's quasi-judicial
functions to an independent "Trade Court" and to assign the FTC's
antitrust responsibilities to the Department of Justice. However,
section 5 of the FTC Act creates difficulty by encompassing both
antitrust regulation and consumer protection authority. The tentative
suggestion here is to divide the section 5 authority of the FTC,
giving "unfair or deceptive acts or practices" to the Department of
Consumers, although admittedly a complete evaluation of this sug-
gestion requires considerably more study.21' Consideration must also
be given to the difficulties involved in separating consumer-oriented
functions from other functions of government departments and to
the temporary management problems involved in creating any new
department in the federal government.
The technical and political difficulties make it unlikely that a
bill to create a Department of Consumers will be passed this year.
212
However, the ultimate prospects for such legislation seem favorable.
Apart from the demonstrable advantages of a consolidation of con-
sumer protection programs, the bill to create a Department of Con-
sumers seems likely to become an emotional goal, or "cause," with
some consumer groups. 213 They view the bill as offering a voice
211. A complete evaluation should include a study made of the FTC's consumer
protection activities by actual observation of FTC daily routine to determine whether,
in practice, the transfer would cause any unanticipated problems. If upon the com-
pletion of this study, the split between "unfair methods of competition" and "unfair
or deceptive acts and practices" seemed undesirable, other alternatives would be
available to establish a unified department regulating consumer protection. These
alternatives include transfer of the FTC in its entirety to the Department of Consumers,
or splitting the FTC's antitrust responsibilities between the Department of Consumers
and the Department of Justice by drafting new statutory powers for both agencies.
212. Two legislative experts, Sens. R. Kennedy and Javits have predicted that the
creation of a Department of Consumers will probably not come in this session of
Congress. House Hearings 123, 131, 138.
213. The National Commission on Food Marketing and the President's Consumer
Advisory Council are reported to have recommended the establishment of a Department
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for the little man in the federal government and as belatedly raising
the consumer to the same status as the farmer (represented by the
Department of Agriculture), the business man (represented by the
Department of Commerce), and the worker (represented by the
Department of Labor) .214 Recent history indicates that congressmen
are not likely to vote against consumer "causes."215
The creation of a Department of Consumers will cause a radical
chaige in the structure of the executive branch of the government.
The danger is that ill-conceived legislation will be enacted without
deliberate and intelligent consideration of the many jurisdictional
and statutory changes which will result from this reorganization and
that the legislation may not transfer even the most fundamental
consumer protection programs (e.g., FTC's consumer protection activ-
ities) to the new Department. Ideally, there would be appointed now
a committee having the stature of the Attorney General's Committee
to Study the Antitrust Laws which could offer authoritative and con-
structive suggestions for the new division of responsibility among
government agencies.216 Alternatively, law reviews would ask noted
authorities and commentators to offer suggestions for such a reorgan-
of Consumers. See Address by Rep. Benjamin S. Rosenthal to the New York Consumer
Assembly, in New York City, Jan. 14, 1967.
214. See, e.g., House Hearings 31, 36, 39, 75, 83, 110, 124, 155, 163, 208; Senate
Hearings 28-29, 53.
215. The most recent example of consumer muscle in Congress involved the Fair
Packaging and Labeling Act. Opponents of the bill managed to hold it in committee
from 1961-1966, but when the bill reached the floor of Congress it passed by an
overwhelming vote. This is a fairly typical example of consumer protection legislation
and suggests that however congressmen may act in committees, when the vote is
taken they generally wish to be recorded in favor of the consumer. See, e.g., Austern,
Sanctions in Silhouette: an Inquiry into the Enforcement of Federal Food and
Cosmetic Act, 18 FOOD DRuG Cosm. L.J. 617, 620 (1963), reporting the passage
of the 1962 Drug Amendments by a unanimous vote. Sen. Hart, sponsor of
the bill which became the Fair Packaging and Labeling Act, authored an article for
the Michigan Law Review entitled Can Federal Legislation Affecting Consumers'
Economic Interests Be Enacted?, 64 MicHr. L. RE.v. 1255 (1966). He suggested that
perhaps only a disaster could move Congress to enact consumer protection legislation.
Id. This lament is difficult to understand in view of the volume of consumer protection
legislation enacted in the 1950's and the 1960's. See note 196 supra and the final vote on
the Fair Packaging and Labeling Act.
216. The need for a study of the relationships of various administrative agencies en-
gaged in consumer protection activities is patent. The Second Citizens Advisory Commit-
tee Report on the Food and Drug Administration recommended: "A comprehensive
study should be made of the jurisdiction of various federal agencies with the ultimate
objective of reducing overlaps and improving coordination." 17 FOOD DRuG CosM. L.J.
581, 675 (1962). Similarly in hearings before the House of Representatives, Professor
Daniel Jay Baum called for: "A study of Federal Trade Commission activity in the
area of consumer protection." House Hearings 304. It is virtually impossible to
examine the maze which now constitutes consumer protection activities of the federal
government and fail to conclude that there should be an easier, more simple procedure.
The type of study which is required is not just legal research but an intensive
observation and review of the daily activities of these agencies.
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ization.217 The essential need is for intelligent and constructive sug-
gestions during the formative period of the proposal. When a bill to
create a Department of Consumers reaches the floor of Congress, it is
likely to move quickly, and political rather than legal considerations
will probably determine its form and the likelihood of its enactment.
The lawyers will then be left to do the best they can with the flotsam
of the various political interest groups.
217. The closest law review articles to this subject are found in Symposium on
Consumer Protection, 64 Mic-r. L. REV. 1197 (1966). This symposium contains general
articles on consumer protection but does not focus upon the problems inherent in
consolidating our consumer protection laws.
